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
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
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**AD-A195 338**

"THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDONESIAN ARMY"

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY  
ON  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDONESIAN ARMY (1954-1964)

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by

Bryan Evans III

May 1988

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## ABSTRACT

The Indonesian Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) is, and has long been, the focus of attention for students of Indonesian politics. This is not unusual considering the prominence of the military (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*), and the Army in particular, in Indonesian political development. The roots of this phenomenon can be traced back to the evolution of the TNI during the cauldron of the Revolution from 1945-49 and to its subsequent post-independence transformation.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the US Army's influence on the TNI's development. In order to do that it is necessary briefly to examine the history of the TNI from its inception, concentrating on two particular areas. The first is the influence of the Dutch-trained officers, generally referred to as ex-KNIL (*Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger*) officers from the Dutch colonial army, and the influence of the Japanese-trained officers from the PETA (*Pembela*



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*Tanah Air*) forces.

The second area of interest are the crises that helped to mold the TNI into a modern army. There are three major events that significantly contributed to this effort: the all important experience gained from the Revolution, the campaign against Darul Islam, and the PRRI-Permesta Rebellion.

These events are examined against the developing ideology of the TNI. The works of Nasution and Simatupang are surveyed in order to obtain a more Indonesian point-of-view of the Army. Following this groundwork an examination of Indonesian participation in US Army training programs will be more enlightening. The portion of the thesis dealing with the US Army concentrates on the training of Indonesians at Fort Leavenworth at the Command and General Staff College and the impact of the Civic Action Program.

The sources for the US portion of the thesis, and for some important observations of the Indonesian side, come from several areas. There are a number of excellent secondary sources that are



used to establish the background. The primary sources supporting the thesis come from the Declassified Documents Reference Service, interviews, and material from the US Army Command and General Staff College. Additionally, the biographical material that has been gathered on the Indonesian Army's officer corps by the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project are extensively utilized. The purpose for compiling the biographical data will be to try to determine if there is a correlation between attendance at the Command and General Staff College and subsequent assignments.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The writer was born on April 11,1956,in Washington,D.C. His father was a US Army officer and as such travelled extensively,finally settling in Fairfax,Virginia where the writer went to high school and matriculated at George Mason University in 1974. He graduated in 1978 with a BA in Government (International Relations),and was commissioned in the US Army as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry. From 1978 to the present he has been on active duty with the US Army,serving in Korea,Fort Bragg and Washington,D.C.,in a variety of infantry assignments. After finishing command in the Nation's Capital,he was assigned to the Defense Language School in Monterey,California for the study of Indonesian. In the Spring of 1987,he enrolled at Cornell University,for a Master of Asian Studies,in the Southeast Asia Program,with a concentration on Indonesia. After the completion of his thesis,he was assigned to the US Embassy,Singapore,to attend the University of Singapore.

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Joye, whose unfailing devotion and support, throughout my career, has made it possible for me to reach one of my, and our, major goals. It is also dedicated to the memory of my father, who will never be able to read the results of his legacy.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper would not have been possible without the help and assistance of a number of individuals and organizations. The thesis itself was the suggestion of Dr. Benedict Anderson, to whom I am most deeply in debt to for all his assistance in unwinding the intricacies of Indonesian military politics; his familiarity with many of the officers was invaluable. Dr. George McT. Kahin, I cannot thank enough for his patience in dealing with all my questions and unending conversations. His attention to detail and research has hopefully been adequately reflected in these pages. He probably felt more like an English professor than a Government professor. It is unfortunate that he is retiring, but I hope it is a productive retirement. Colonel George Benson gave generously of his time for interviews, as did the Army Attaché of the Indonesian Embassy, Lieutenant Colonel Jusuf Domi. I wish to extend a special thanks, *berutang budi*, to Dr. Takashi Shiraishi and his wife Saya. Without his support, friendship and

spirited discussions I think this thesis would not have achieved much at all; I am also grateful to Saya for lending me her thesis and knowledge of Aceh, both of them will be missed very much.

Last, but not least, I want to thank my wife, Joye, who with a great deal of patience, put up with my long hours in the library and at the typewriter. Without her unfailing support, this project would not have been completed.

This project and its contents are my responsibility alone and do not represent the views of the US Army or the US government.

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## GLOSSARY

*badan perjuangan*: struggle organization

*CPM*: Military Police

*diplomasi*: policy followed during the Revolution, to pursue a negotiated independence

*Gestapu/G30S*: The 30 September 1965 Coup toppling Sukarno

*karya*: literally, business. Usually used in the term *perwira karya*, which denotes an officer assigned to civil/business duties.

*Kas*: Kepala Staff, i.e., Chief of Staff.

*Komandan*: Commander, usually seen as an abbreviation titles, e.g., DanSESKOAD.

*KOTI*: Komando Operasi Tertinggi, i.e., Supreme Operational Command.

*KOTOE*: Komando Operasi Tertinggi Ekonomi, i.e., Supreme Command for Economic Operations.



*lasykar*: Paramilitary units of the political parties during the Revolution.

*MOBRIG*: or Brimob, the Police Mobile Brigade.

*Panglima*: connotes more than just a commander, usually abbreviated in titles, e.g., PANGAD.

*pemuda*: youth; this term is used most often to refer to the younger generation during the Revolution.

*SESKOAD*: Indonesian Command and Staff College.

*SPRI*: Staff Pribadi, i.e., Personal Staff.

*SUAD*: Army General Staff

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about the influence of the United States Army on the development of the Indonesian Army during the period 1954-1964. This is an unusual statement, because generally when one considers US influence on other nations, it is in the form of a "package" comprised of both military and non-military assistance from several agencies. This is the major difference in the Indonesian situation.

The military in Indonesia, specifically the Army, was assuming such a prominent role in the political life of the country during this time period, that it became an alternate source of power and influence in the country. The army-to-army relationship was very unusual in that it developed through a series of personal relations revolving around one American officer, and was sustained and strengthened through US military assistance.

Precisely how this relationship formed, what it eventually became and how it affected the development of the Indonesian Army are the questions to be

answered in the following chapters. First, the composition of the officer corps of the Indonesian Army will be examined, in order to show the basis from which developed the politicization of the Army. Second, the historical events that shaped the officer corps are analysed. This is extremely important, for these experiences shaped the development of the Army's ideology and doctrine, which sanctified its dominant position in Indonesian society. Finally, the impact of US military aid, both through the Civic Action Program and training in US Army schools, on the development of the Indonesian Army's ideology and doctrine is assessed.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE COMPOSITION OF THE OFFICER CORPS

The creation of the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*(TNI) was at best a haphazard process. With the surrender of the Japanese at the end of World War II and the subsequent Proclamation of Independence,the Republic of Indonesia was born. The birth of the Army would have to wait,for it was constituted not from the government down,which eventually decreed its formation,but from the bottom up.

There existed no centralized militia,or military force of any nature to defend this new-found independence,let alone to maintain law and order. The military organizations available were remnants of the Japanese Occupation,and with the exception of the *Tokubetsu Keisatsutai*(a heavily armed,highly trained mobile police force) they had been disbanded and disarmed in order to comply with the instructions of the Allied Command,as interpreted by the Japanese.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>B.O'G. Anderson,*Java in a Time of Revolution*,(Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1972),p.141.

After the Declaration of Independence, independent militias proliferated and it soon became obvious to the new government that a centralized organization of some type was needed both to protect the Indonesian people from in-fighting amongst these various groups and to establish the authority of the Republican government, yet it had to be one that would not antagonize the Allied Powers. Thus on August 20, 1945, *Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang* (BPKKP: Committees to Help War Victims) were formed and within them *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (BKR: Committees for the People's Security), the nuclei of the TNI.<sup>2</sup> On October 5, 1945 the BKR was officially redesignated *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (TKR: People's Security Army) in recognition, by the government, of the reality that a more clearly military body was needed to encompass both internal and external security, especially in the face of Allied Forces troop landings.<sup>3</sup> However, this institution would not be able to contain the rapidly multiplying independent militias from pulling away from the center.

The reasons for this spontaneity have been documented to a far greater

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<sup>2</sup>A.H. Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, vol. 1, (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Militer, 1956), p. 11. Anderson, pp. 103 and 141.

<sup>3</sup>Anderson, *Java...*, p. 232. See also, Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 7.

extent than is possible in this thesis.<sup>4</sup> Suffice it to say that the attitudes of some high-ranking Japanese regarding Indonesian nationalism, the military units that they established to support the Japanese Imperial Forces and the type of training these units received, greatly contributed to the *lasykars* (military units formed by the *pemuda*) pulling away from the government of the Republic.<sup>5</sup> To understand the internal strains on the Army, and its reaction to them, it is best to examine the groups that composed the officer corps of the TKR. The officer corps can be divided into four categories: the ex-PETA officers, the ex-Giyugun officers, the ex-KNIL officers and officers who surfaced out of the *lasykar*.

### The PETA Officers

The *Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air* (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Homeland, or PETA) military organization was formed in October, 1943, on

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.; Anderson's book is a very thorough analysis of the *Pemuda* Movement in Java during the Revolution, and he documents very well the emotional and spiritual drive of the *pemuda*.

<sup>5</sup>This is not to say that the Japanese deliberately disbanded these units in order to ferment revolution; on the contrary, they were disbanded by order of the Allied Forces.

Java and Bali, as an auxiliary to the 16th Imperial Japanese Army, to aid in the defense of Java from the anticipated Allied invasion.<sup>6</sup> This organization provided the first opportunity for Indonesians to be officered, on a large-scale, by their compatriots, for all PETA officers were Indonesians. The main beneficiaries of this system were the grades below battalion commander (usually a Major [*Daidancho*]), who was usually selected because of his standing in the community, i.e., he did not rise through the hierarchy,<sup>7</sup> whereas the lower ranks of officers were comprised of youths with a secondary education (these men were mostly the sons of lower ranking *priyayi* who could afford to educate their sons).<sup>8</sup>

Equally important in reference to the PETA officers was the level and type of training to which they were exposed. The PETA officers were given intense highly

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<sup>6</sup>Rudolph Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military: 1945-1965*, (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978). p22.

<sup>7</sup>Anderson, *Java*, pp. 24-25. George Sanford Kanahale, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence". (Doctoral Dissertation: Cornell University, 1967). p124.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.* Some of the officers from the PETA who were to become prominent in the Indonesian Army are; Gatot Subroto and now President Suharto. It is interesting to note, that these men had been associated with the KNIL prior to entering the PETA. Sundhaussen, *Road...*, p.14.

disciplined instruction in small unit tactics, especially guerrilla warfare, with stress being placed on the triumph of spirit, *semangat*, over material arms.<sup>9</sup> This last point deserves special attention as it had a very strong influence on the character of the TNI.

The training period for the PETA was three months long and provided basic rudimentary military skills and hand-to-hand combat training. There was strong emphasis placed on physical stamina and combat techniques, while there was little to no training in military theory or organization.<sup>10</sup> This emphasis on *semangat* was very much in keeping with Japanese military tradition and also had great affinity with the Indonesian concept of the *satria*, or warrior-knight.<sup>11</sup> These Japanese concepts fit very snugly into what Anderson terms the "life arc" of the Javanese male.<sup>12</sup>

In this "life arc" as the youth reaches his teens he is sent away for instruction to either a *pesantren* (an Islamic school) under a locally famous or renowned

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<sup>9</sup>Mrazek, *The United States...*, p.24.

<sup>10</sup>Kanahele, "The Japanese...", p.125. The Japanese also had no intention of establishing a professional army, such as in Burma, and therefore did not need to train the Indonesians in advanced command and control, for that was provided by the Japanese.

<sup>11</sup>Anderson, op. cit., pp.30-32; Mrazek, op. cit., pp.23-24.

<sup>12</sup>Anderson, op. cit., pp.6-10.



*kyai*, or to a *jago*, a teacher/practitioner of Javanese martial arts or mysticism who is renowned as having magical powers. The key to this period of instruction is, one, its physical isolation from the community; two, the harsh discipline involved; three, the austere conditions under which the young student lives; all of which are designed to enhance the spiritual development and strength of the young man.<sup>13</sup> These young men later return to their villages to resume their positions in society, a few becoming wandering *santri*, men who under the right circumstances are prepared for a coming upheaval in society.<sup>14</sup> This concept had a direct parallel with the programs of the Japanese to include the physical isolation of the PETA training site. It is also worth noting here that a major part of the emphasis on *semangat* was directed to the fostering of a strongly nationalist spirit in the candidate as he was going to go and defend his home (Java) against the invasion of the imperialists.<sup>15</sup>

The last point to consider is the actual organization of the PETA. The importance of the point cannot be over-stressed as the PETA was to form the

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-24.

<sup>15</sup> Kanahela, "The Japanese...", p. 123.

"backbone of the TNI".<sup>16</sup> What is most important to understand about its organization was that the PETA was designed to fight a guerrilla war and thus was to fight in its area of recruitment.<sup>17</sup> This aim was implicit in the selection of local leaders as battalion commanders, men who would be able to draw and recruit the necessary youngsters to their units. Just as obvious are the inherent problems with such an arrangement on unit discipline, e.g., absenteeism from the unit and the maintenance of discipline when home was around the corner. But in the context of Japanese strategy this was a minor problem. The localized nature of the units was accentuated by the lack of a command and control system to facilitate coordinated action or operations and the sharing of supplies or information between units. This unit autonomy was due both to the lack of training provided to the higher echelon leaders and the expected reality of a localized guerrilla war on Java against the Allies; not a fear on the part of the Japanese of a unified military organization.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). p.109.

<sup>17</sup>Anderson, op. cit., pp.24-25; see also Kanahole, op. cit., pp.126-127.

<sup>18</sup>Kanahole, op. cit., p.126. It is also important to remember, that the Japanese command and control of the PETA was in congruence with their war strategy, and the exclusion of Indonesians from the decision-making arena was a calculated decision, though

The picture that arises of the PETA officer is a man who was strongly nationalistic, used to the absence of a centralized authority and with very strong local ties. In addition, he was well-trained in small unit tactics, especially guerrilla warfare, but was unfamiliar with higher-level staff procedures or coordination, and probably not very interested in them either. These characteristics were to have a major impact on the subsequent development of the Indonesian Army.

#### The *Giyugun* Officer

It is very easy to confuse events on Java with all of Indonesia, therefore it is important to consider what was happening on the Outer Islands. Not a great deal has been written about the activities of the Japanese on the Outer Islands, but it is important not to forget them in the development of the TNI.

East Indonesia, which was under the auspices of the Japanese Navy, did not form any substantial military units and there are three probable reasons for this:

1. The Japanese Navy had neither the personnel, the training nor the skills required to raise and train an infantry militia.

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some Indonesian officers did participate in the higher-level staffs, e.g., Zulkifli Lubis.

2. The amount of time,resources and funds required would probably not be justified by the results.

3. The Navy had a distrust of the people of the area,especially the Ambonese and Menadonese.<sup>19</sup>

The only exception to this was the PETA organization on Bali,but that was established under the auspices of the Army.The lack of this type of organization would be a key factor in effecting the slow postwar rise of the nationalist movement in East Indonesia.<sup>20</sup> The area of East Indonesia had been a major recruiting ground for the Dutch KNIL,and without any viable Republic formations,the spread of nationalism was severely curtailed.<sup>21</sup>

On Sumatra the situation was a little different,with a PETA-type organization called the *Giyugun*(Volunteer Army) being established by the 25th Japanese Army. The main differences between the *Giyugun* and the PETA lay in the size of the units,their responsibilities and their geographical dispersion.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.,p.131. The obvious reason for this is their close relationship with the Dutch,for they had formed the bulk of the personnel for the KNIL. This coupled with the fact that a large body of the KNIL had escaped to Australia was a cause for concern among the Navy command.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.,pp.130-131; he describes the establishment of the PETA units on Bali as an unusual example of Army-Navy cooperation.

<sup>21</sup>Kahin,*Nationalism...*,pp.355-368.

The *Giyugun* was not organized above platoon-size until late in the war.<sup>23</sup>

The reasons for this were two-fold; one, the 25th Army, which consisted mainly of the 2nd *Konoe* Division, which claimed to be one of the Imperial Army's best, did not feel, initially, that it needed the extra manpower; two, once established, the duties of the *Giyugun* were confined mainly to rear area activities, i.e.; guarding of bases and airfields.<sup>24</sup> The other major characteristic of the *Giyugun* was its dispersion. Unlike its counterpart on Java, more than three separate training sites were established on Sumatra.<sup>25</sup> Thus there was no common training experience for all Sumatran officers, combined with the sheer physical obstacles of the Sumatran terrain this contributed to the lack of cohesiveness amongst the

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p.129.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Saya Shiraishi, "Aceh under the Japanese Occupation: Rival Leaders in Aceh Besar and Pidie". (MA Thesis presented to the Graduate School of the International Christian University, 1975), pp.26-28. Kanahele's assertion about the size of the *Giyugun* is supported on pages 46-47, on which she points out that as the Japanese war effort deteriorated the 25th Army was forced to expand both the manpower and scope of the *Giyugun*. Additionally, the Japanese had anticipated an invasion of Sumatra from Burma and Ceylon.

<sup>25</sup>Kanahele, op. cit., p.128. He lists the training sites as; Pagar Alam (South), Padang (West), Siborongborong (East) and a reported one at Lho Seumawe (North).

postwar units. This is the only discernable reason for the dispersion, beside the ethnic diversity of the region, which effected the Japanese-sponsored nationalist groups, and which would effect future political developments.<sup>26</sup> The other problem faced by the Japanese, and later by the new Republican government, was that the nationalist movement on Sumatra, which was slightly different in its ideology than that on Java. Especially in Aceh, the nationalist movement was based on a concept of regional autonomy, which while advocating an independent Indonesia, saw Acehnese independence as inherent to this concept.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid.; Kanahale mentions the ethnic diversity within the nationalist movement there, which leads to the conclusion that it was unavoidable within the *Giyugun*.

<sup>27</sup>Shiraishi, "Aceh...", pp. 47-50. Shiraishi discusses the efforts of the 25th Army to expand the guerrilla networks of the *Giyugun*, finally having to resort to the leadership of the F-K:Kan (Movement), a Japanese espionage operation prior to their invasion, which had linked up with a radical, Acehnese anti-Dutch, but not pro-Japanese, movement, that had risen on the eve of the Japanese invasion. She also discussed with me the importance of the Acehnese concept of independence. See also Anthony Reid, *The Blood of the People*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979). This book covers the entire area of North Sumatra and the rise of the nationalist movement there.

### The KNIL Officer

The next component of the Indonesian officer corps were the ex-KNIL officers. Generally comprised of Christian, Outer Island ethnic minority groups (mainly Minahassan and Ambonese), very few of them were permitted to become officers in colonial times. Not until the opening of the Military Cadet School in Bandung, West Java (sometime in early 1940, after the German occupation of the Netherlands) was the proportion of Indonesians to increase in the predominantly Dutch officer corps.<sup>28</sup> The characteristics common to most of the ex-KNIL officers can be described as almost direct opposite to those of the PETA group.

The ex-KNIL officer was generally more professional in outlook, a by-product of his Western-based education and military background. He was also more well-versed in the organization, procedures and operations of staffs above the battalion level. Within this group there was a special group of officers known as

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<sup>28</sup>Sundhaussen, *Road...*, p.1. Additionally, some Indonesians had the opportunity to study at the Netherlands Military Academy in Breda (Netherlands), but the numbers were miniscule. With the advent of the War in Europe and Holland's fall to Hitler, the need for a closer facility (Bandung) was recognized.

the "Bandung-graduates". Members of this group were to have a major, and lasting, impact on the development of the TNI. This group included Abdul Haris Nasution, T.B. Simatupang, Rachmat Kartakusumah, A.J. Mokoginta and Alex Kawilarang amongst others.<sup>29</sup> What differentiated the "Bandung-graduates" from the KNIL group as a whole was their age and education. Generally speaking, these men were younger, Sundanese or from the Outer Islands, and familiar, if not personal friends, with many of the civilian politicians then vying for control in Jakarta (1946); thus, they were much more inclined to be involved in the national-level political conflicts of the period than the older KNILers, such as Urip Sumohardjo.<sup>30</sup> The KNIL officers were very few, perhaps 30-40 in number, but their more extensive military education gave them some advantages over the PETA group. These skills of the KNIL group were what prompted Sukarno to appoint an ex-KNIL major, Urip Sumohardjo (who had come up through the KNIL's ranks), to develop a centralized military organization after the 5 October 1945 announcement of the BKR.

It is very obvious that the skills of the KNIL officers and the PETA officers

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-14; Anderson, op. cit., p. 234.

<sup>30</sup>Anderson, ibid.



were in a sense complementary, but within this relationship lay the seeds of division; in the eyes of the PETA officers the KNIL group was untrustworthy because of their Dutch service, it was difficult enough for them to obey these men let alone have them running the Army.

### The *Lasykar* Officers

Very few *lasykar* officers would become prominent in the post-Revolution TNI, but their impact on the development of the TNI cannot be minimized.<sup>31</sup> Most of the *lasykar*, were paramilitary units of what were called *badan perjuangan* (struggle organizations),<sup>32</sup> and were composed of the politicized youth known as the *pemuda*. Generally speaking the previous military training and experience of these youths was limited or non-existent. Lacking, in addition, experienced leadership and discipline they were to present a continuing

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<sup>31</sup> Those that achieved some prominence were, Soetoko of the Bandung Pesindo and Suwanto and Hartono of the Central Java *Tentara Pelajar* (Student Army). Sundhaussen, p. 14. Also, Ali Murtopo, who was a member of the Islamic *Hizbullah*. Conversation with Ben Anderson.

<sup>32</sup> Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 7.

problem for the emerging Army.

Having suffered under the Dutch and the Japanese, the *pemuda* were not eager to enter into the strategy of *diplomasi* which was advocated by the older nationalist leaders.<sup>33</sup> The *pemuda* had listened to and moved by the stirring speeches of Sukarno during the Japanese Occupation and believed in the Japanese promise of eventual independence. Thus, the declaration of the 17 August 1945 Proclamation of Independence was the necessary spark to ignite the spirit of *merdeka* (freedom) and *perjuangan* (struggle) within them.<sup>34</sup>

This rejection of *perjuangan* is the underlying reason for the major characteristic of both the *lasykars* and *badan perjuangan*, a deep distrust of the older established leadership. They especially did not want to be subordinated to the leadership of the TNI, which they saw as little more than an arm of the government and *diplomasi*. This feature of the *lasykar* groups lent them readily to exploitation by political parties, one of the major causes of rifts between the TNI

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<sup>33</sup> *Diplomasi* was the term applied to the efforts of the Republican leadership to bring about Indonesian independence through negotiations with the Dutch starting in 1946.

<sup>34</sup> Anderson, op. cit., p.308. Anderson describes *perjuangan* as less a goal and more a state of being, a description that meshes very well with his description of *merdeka* as not an international transaction, but rather an inner experience. See also p.185.

and the various civil governments in Indonesia.

The seeds for discontent can be easily detected in the fledgling Indonesian Army. But, it was not until the attempts of the central leadership to form a cohesive force that they erupted, and their eruption would affect not only the character of the TNI, but ultimately the nation as a whole.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE FORMATIVE YEARS

For the purposes of this thesis the years 1945-1949 have been somewhat arbitrarily selected as the formative years of both the Indonesian Army and the Republic. It was during this time, the Revolution, that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia gradually came to be considered the only legitimate military organization in the archipelago. During this period occurred the crystallization of ideas, attitudes, and problems that would have a profound effect on the later development of the armed forces, and the Army in particular. One of the most important aspects of the development of the Indonesian Army was how it began--not from the top down, but rather was built from the bottom up.

#### Overview of the Military's Development

The birth of the first Republican military units occurred free of government

encouragement or interference. This situation was not to last for very long, as the Republican government rapidly came to the realization that a responsive and centralized military was required in order that the goals of the government could be fulfilled. However, the government was not very energetic in pursuing this goal, though they recognized the need for it.<sup>1</sup>

With the formation of the *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (TKR: People's Security Army) on 5 October 1945, the Republican Government had reached the realization that they could no longer afford to ignore the external threat to Indonesia's independence. However, as the name implies, the government was still largely concerned with internal security and with efforts not to offend the Allied Powers.<sup>2</sup> To this end, Sukarno selected Urip Sumohardjo as Chief of the

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<sup>1</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 19-20, points out the ambivalence of the Sukarno Cabinet in dealing with the military, citing the vacancy of the post of Minister of Defense and the filling of the Army Commander position with a dead (though legendary) man. Nasution, *TNI*, pp. 118-121 gives a fairly good rendition of Army feelings at this time, but it must be understood in the context of the time period in which it was written. In 1956, he had just been re-instated as Chief of Staff and was attempting to centralize control and confronting opposition both from within the military and without.

<sup>2</sup>Kahin, op. cit., pp. 141-143. There were two reasons that the Republican Government did not wish to antagonize the Allies; one, Sukarno, Hatta and a number of other members of the government had been trying to avoid being labeled collaborators and thus destroying any credibility the young government might have. Two, since the Allies had a much greater array of force at their disposal, the Republican government needed to demonstrate that they were in control in the country, it hoped peaceably to avoid the return of the Dutch.

General Headquarters, to establish this new organization. It is important to understand the conditions under which Urip was asked to form an army.

Soon after the Proclamation of Independence, *pemuda* had formed themselves into *lasykars* to begin the *perjuangan*. There were no coordinated operations or actions under government control, and the situation rapidly deteriorated when Dutch officials were landed, in Java and Sumatra, under the auspices of British forces. This chaos more than any other factor prompted the Republic to recognize the need for a formal army.

Unfortunately, the former PETA (Java) and *Giyugun* (Sumatra) hierarchies, what little there were, had been lost in the disbandment of those organizations (18-23 August 1945) by the Japanese. Thereafter leaders tended to be "elected" by their subordinates based on their ability, not age and social standing.<sup>3</sup> Units were thus forming on the basis of the leader's charisma, in a fashion similar to the way *jago* gathered their followers.<sup>4</sup> Thus the task facing

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<sup>3</sup>Anderson, op. cit., pp. 105-106. For the *Giyugun* see Reid, op. cit., pp. 153-154.

<sup>4</sup>Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture", in Claire Holt, eds., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). pp. 1-69. The figure of the *jago* was very prominent in Javanese culture as a figure on the edge of the law, skilled in martial arts and bowing to no man's will.

Urip as he set about organizing an army was formidable, and on top of this Urip himself as a former KNIL officer, had a Dutch taint. Additionally, he was only the Chief of Staff of the Army (a position generally connoting responsibility for administrative affairs), while the position of Commander of the Army was initially left unfilled as was the position of Minister of Defense.<sup>5</sup>

To accomplish his task Urip turned to those officers who had the training, experience and the language (Dutch) to operate a centralized organization; ex-KNIL officers, not PETA trained officers. The problem, however, was that these ex-KNIL officers had no armed troops loyal to them, unlike the ex-PETA officers, and in addition, their association with the Dutch now put them at a moral disadvantage.<sup>6</sup> The nationalistic indoctrination that the PETA-trained officers had undergone greatly exacerbated this problem and made conciliation hard to obtain. Additionally, there was a phenomenon in the new units that has been termed "*bapakism*", a term which came to be used to describe the highly personal relationship between a commander and his soldiers, *bapak-anak*

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<sup>5</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 7. The position of Army Commander was filled by a former PETA leader, Suprijadi, who had led the Blitar Uprising (February 1945) against the Japanese. He was never seen again, but it was believed that he would return in time of Indonesia's need.

<sup>6</sup>Anderson, *Java*, p. 235.

*buah*, or father and son.<sup>7</sup> This spiritual type of relationship had been fostered by the Japanese in their training, and it served to reinforce the traditional Javanese precepts about power and the responsibilities that it entails.<sup>8</sup> The problem that evolved, was that these officers had, through this relationship, constructed formidable power bases. When attempts were made to transfer or replace them, either it did not occur, or the subsequent new commander was unsure of the troops' loyalty to him.

Urip's plan for an organizational structure also faced some more concrete obstacles in its implementation. With the spontaneous formation of the various *lasykars*, supply and especially weapons procurement had become haphazard at the best. The disbanding of the Japanese-era military organizations, besides destroying the only readily available military units for the new government, had also relieved it of the only easily accessible source of weapons and ammunition

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<sup>7</sup>A.H. Nasution, *TNI... Vol. 1*, p.56; and especially pp.155-156. That is the literal translation of the Indonesian, but it would perhaps be more appropriate to describe the relationship in terms of the *jago* and his followers (see note 4 above) since one of the other unique features of the young army was its lack of disparity in age groups. If the reader will recall Anderson's description of the "life-arc" of a Javanese youth, the *jago* is one of the three teachers available, and as he already lived on the fringe of society could prove to be very appealing in the chaos of the Revolution.

<sup>8</sup>Anderson, "The Idea of Power...", pp.1-69. See also *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp.236-238.



in the archipelago. The *lasykars* remedied this situation either by persuading the local Japanese garrison commanders to surrender their weapons or by forcibly seizing them. The great variance of success in these endeavors resulted in a situation in which some units wielded armed power far-out-of-proportion to their size. Thus, the issue of the procurement of weapons was to become a very political one, reaching the point where *lasykar* units and regular units (TNI) were fighting each other over the control of weapons.<sup>9</sup>

The TNI, quite naturally, as the legitimate military organ of the government, wanted and needed to have complete control over the means of violence. In addition to this, they desperately needed to stop the competition at the town level (where the arms caches were located) between the *lasykar* and the regular units. Part of the problem was that the TNI, as an organ of the government, was not necessarily viewed in a favorable light, for many people did not support the government's policy of *diplomasi*, preferring the policy of *perjuangan* favored by the *lasykar*.<sup>10</sup>

Urip's unification effort was supported by the government, formed in

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<sup>9</sup>Anderson, *Java*, pp. 239-240.

<sup>10</sup>Sundhaussen, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

November 1945, provided that the ensuing military organization was loyal. The problem lay in the fact that the Minister of Defense, Amir Syarifuddin, was bitterly opposed to the TNI's assertion that it ought to have an autonomous position in the government as a political force in its own right. The Syarifuddin/TNI conflict was carried over into the field, where Syarifuddin was willing to make political use of certain *lasykar*. He ignored the TNI's willingness to respond positively to the government--provided that the *lasykar* were brought under the TNI's control.<sup>11</sup> It was not until after the first Dutch military action of July-August 1947 (which will be discussed later) that the problem of the *lasykar* was solved.

It is therefore not surprising that the logical, centrally planned and controlled structure of Urip existed on paper only. In the face of these difficulties, and the Allied landings and their advances inland, the officer corps pressed the government to fill the positions of Army Commander and Minister of Defense, and when they did not, Urip Sumohardjo convened an all divisional and regimental commanders conference in Jogjakarta on 12 November 1945.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 24-25. See also Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army [Part 1]", *Indonesia* no. 11 (April 1971), p. 136.

<sup>12</sup> Due to the fighting in West Java, only the Central and East Java commanders were able to attend.

The main purpose of this conference was to select an Army Commander and a Minister of Defense. But, the rivalry between the ex-KNIL officers and the ex-PETA officers quickly surfaced. In the end ex-PETA *Daidancho* Sudirman was finally elected as *Panglima Besar* (a term connoting more than just Commander of the Army) and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengkubuwono IX, was elected as the Minister of Defense.<sup>13</sup> Sudirman exemplified the triumph of the PETA group over the KNIL group.<sup>14</sup>

His appointment as *Panglima Besar* was not only a reflection of the PETA majority, but also a reaffirmation of the Javanese precepts of the *satria*. Besides the reputation he had acquired as a combat commander<sup>15</sup>, Sudirman had managed to acquire the largest supply of arms in Central Java, and, perhaps more importantly he had the aura of power. It is this idea that is preeminent, for Sudirman displayed those qualities of asceticism, piety, warmth and gentleness that were the hallmark of the traditional *satria*, and so appealing to the

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<sup>13</sup>As one of the few aristocrats who supported the Republican effort, the sultan was very popular and had taken to wearing military uniforms.

<sup>14</sup>Nasution, *TNI*..., p.157. Dr. Anderson also pointed out that the actual margin of victory was quite narrow, with the majority of officers present being from Central Java.

<sup>15</sup>Anderson, *Java*, pp.244-245f; see also Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.8.

Javanese.<sup>16</sup>

The convening of the Jogjakarta Conference was the first time that the TNI served notice that it was willing to move into the arena of civilian politics in order to achieve its aims. By selecting a Minister of Defense it was usurping the prerogative of the Prime Minister to select his own cabinet. In addition, since the young Republic was setting its course for a parliamentary form of government, the issue of civilian supremacy over the military was quickly made an issue. It is now necessary to examine the perspective of the civilian elite, so that a more rounded background may be obtained for understanding the TNI's development.

### The Political Situation

There were three major problem areas that plagued the Indonesian Army in this period; the organization of the military, the question of the proper strategy to pursue in the conflict against the Dutch, and last, the increasing friction in civil-military relations. Before entering into a discussion of these issues, it is necessary

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<sup>16</sup>Anderson, *Java*, p. 245.

first to trace briefly the political developments during this period to understand how these effected the development of the TNI.<sup>17</sup>

There is already a substantial body of knowledge concerning the evolution of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, especially for the period covered both in this chapter and the thesis as a whole.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this paper to give more than a very brief description of the major events that were to shape not only the structure, but the attitudes of the TNI.

The first point is that during this period there was continuous effort on the part of the various political groupings and parties to influence the political alignment of the TKR. This would not have been so big a problem if the Republican government alone had been exerting the pressure. But opposition groups also made themselves felt. In addition, there was no unanimously held, or definitive, ideology for the Republic, and much depended on the particular parties

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<sup>17</sup>The name of the Indonesian Army underwent a number of changes before finally reaching its current form; after the BKR was recognized as insufficient, the name was changed to TKR to denote its expanded role. As it assumed greater control over the various *lasykar* the name was changed again to the *Tentara Republik Indonesia* (24 JAN 46) and finally to the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (5 MAY 47).

<sup>18</sup>See Kahin, *Nationalism*; see also Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

which formed the cabinet at different times.<sup>19</sup>

As parties attempted to influence the orientation of the military, the officer corps became both a target, as well as a source, of political maneuvering. It must be remembered that the PETA-trained officers, who comprised the majority of the officer corps, were trained in an atmosphere of nationalist political indoctrination, and saw themselves as nationalists first and officers second. It was thus quite natural for them to participate in politics. These factors all became intertwined in the debate over which type of strategy to pursue in confronting the Dutch, i.e.; negotiation or armed confrontation? The officer corps of the TKR had very definite feelings and opinions about which was the proper policy, and they used the arena of civilian politics to forward their viewpoint. To see how these factors came into play, and the legacy that remained, three major events in the young Republic's life will be examined; the July 3 Affair, the Dutch military actions and the Madiun Affair.

The first major confrontation of the Army and the government occurred

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<sup>19</sup>Some may argue that the *Panca Sila* constituted an ideology, but there is more than enough room in this concept for a varying number of interpretations, which most personalities during this period proceeded to develop. For an in-depth examination of these principles see Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 122-127.

during the period of the first Syahrir Cabinet. The conference, convened by Urip in November 1945, to elect an Army Commander and a Minister of Defense, was a direct challenge to the government.<sup>20</sup> What is interesting to note here, is the parallel between the actions of the TKR and the traditions of the Japanese Imperial Army. In the Japanese Army, the senior officers selected the Minister of the Army, while the Army Commander was determined by a set pattern of bureaucratic succession. The Commander was directly responsible to the Emperor, as of course was the Minister, and both men were, in the 1930's and 1940's, active duty officers.<sup>21</sup> This effectively gave the Japanese armed forces control over cabinets, for by withdrawing their Ministers, they could cause a cabinet to fall. It was in this same spirit that Sudirman moved to insure the army's position in the government and to consolidate that position.<sup>22</sup>

For the above reasons Syahrir could not afford to allow the wishes of the Army conference to dictate to him in matters he felt were his prerogative alone. Ultimately, his choice for Minister of Defense (Amir Syarifuddin) prevailed.

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<sup>20</sup>Anderson, *Java*, pp. 244-250. See also, Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

<sup>21</sup>The situation was the same for the Japanese Imperial Navy.

<sup>22</sup>Anderson, *Java*, p. 246.

However, Sudirman remained as the Army Commander. In order to oppose the Army, and its monopoly of the means of violence, Syahrir needed armed power of his own. To this end he relied on Amir Syarifuddin, his Minister of Defense, who reorganized the Ministry, placing the Air Force and Navy under his direct control as well as the Military Police.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, he developed the MOBRIG (*Mobiele Brigade Polisi*: Police Mobile Brigade) along the same lines as the Siliwangi Division, but made sure this unit was more loyal to the Syahrir government.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to the above, Amir formed the *Biro Perjuangan* (1946), later to be called the *TNI-Masyarakat* (People's National Army of Indonesia), the function of which was the control of the *lasykar* as a separate force. This move created a problem for the TRI;<sup>25</sup> if they directly opposed the government they would in essence be in direct opposition to Sukarno, who while not fully endorsing Syarifuddin's position, had lent his support to the *pemuda* and *lasykar*

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<sup>23</sup>Though the Air Force and Navy were virtually non-existent, he had control of the marines (KKo) and was to develop the military police (CPM) into a very powerful unit.

<sup>24</sup>Kahin, pp. 184-185 discusses the development of the Siliwangi and Mobrig. Both units were organized around a core of Dutch trained officers. Kahin asserts that the educational level of the Mobrig was of even higher quality than that of the Siliwangi. Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 25 discusses the reorganization under Syarifuddin.

<sup>25</sup>See note 12 for the date of the change.



conference that led to the formation of the *Pesindo*.<sup>26</sup> Compounding this move by the Minister of Defense was the creation of a *Staf Pendidikan* which was to have the responsibility of politically indoctrinating the Army.<sup>27</sup> Not only its formation, but its composition too angered the officer corps. It was comprised mostly of Socialist and Masjumi Party members, who were given general officer ranks, though they had no military training.<sup>28</sup>

To combat what the officer corps considered unwarranted interference in military affairs, an Advisory Council was established, by Sudirman, on 20 April 1946 to have the same function as the *Staf Pendidikan* and division commanders were urged to do the same for their own commands. What served to inflame tensions was the composition of these councils which were generally comprised of politicians and *pemuda* who were in opposition to the government and its policy of *diplomasi*. The Army, under Sudirman's guidance, also moved closer to Tan Malaka's *Persatuan Perjuangan* which advocated 100% *Merdeka*

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<sup>26</sup>The conference was held 10 NOV 45. *Pesindo* is an acronym for *Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia* (Indonesian Socialist Youth).

<sup>27</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 25-26.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, see also, p. 54. Sundhaussen points out that of the seven members of the *Staf Pendidikan* only Dr. Mustopo had any military experience. p. 26.

by *perjuangan* and the confiscation of Dutch properties in Indonesia. This shift was stimulated not only by the Syahrir government's moves, but as more Dutch troops were landed, by the apparent failure of its policy of *diplomasi*.<sup>29</sup> This conflict was to culminate in July 1946, in what has come to be described as the "July 3 Affair".

### The "July 3 Affair"

Essentially, the "3 July Affair" was an effort by a small group of officers and civilian politicians closely allied with Tan Malaka's group to seize power. As the TRI leaders lent their support to Tan Malaka's *Persatuan Perjuangan*, they quickly came to gain a great deal of political ground on Syahrir's government. Apparently, Sudirman, "was pursuing his own politique and clearly looking for the kind of support in civilian circles that he already enjoyed among the military, to make himself even more impregnable to Cabinet intrigue."<sup>30</sup>

The "Affair" itself was an attempted coup on the part of some people in the

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>30</sup>Anderson, *Java*, p. 409.

*Persatuan Perjuangan* to topple the Syahrir Cabinet and place itself in a position of power. Elements of the IIIrd Division, under General Sudarsono, the IVth Division under Sutarto and certain *lasykar* units participated in the attempt. The Siliwangi Division and units of the Pesindo moved to contain and crush the attempt. Up to this point Sudirman and the majority of his staff had remained "neutral", i.e., they were sitting on the sidelines waiting to see which side would come out ahead. But, with the advent of the possibility of civil war they finally emerged against the coup.<sup>31</sup>

It is important to understand the position of the Army after the conclusion of the "3 July Affair". Though Sudirman had lost a substantial amount of civilian support with the dissolution of the *Persatuan Perjuangan*, after July 3, he was able to achieve a concession to the role of the TRI in politics. By not taking any action against Sudirman, Sukarno was at the least tacitly giving recognition and approval of the military's continuing role in both politics and the formation of policy. On a more mundane level, Sudirman was promoted by Sukarno to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, giving him direct control

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<sup>31</sup>Kahin, op. cit., pp. 188-191.

over the Air Force and Navy. To complement this, a year later, Sukarno ordered the merger of the *lasykar* organizations into the TRI, renaming it the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*.<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately, a name change does not make an army an effective fighting force, as the first Dutch military action was to show.

### The Dutch Military Actions

In the period ensuing between the conclusion of the "July 3 Affair" and the first Dutch military action, the cabinets of the Republic were concerned with the attainment of ratification of the Linggadjati Agreement, and its subsequent implementation.<sup>33</sup> When the Republic refused to accede to the demands of the Dutch, the Dutch launched their first attack.<sup>34</sup>

The seriousness of the TNI's unpreparedness was emphasized in the

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<sup>32</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 32. See also note 12 for the actual date.

<sup>33</sup>The best account of this period is in Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 196-212. The Linggadjati Agreement was signed on 15 November 1946, and was supposed to be the basis for opening the way for Indonesia's independence through negotiations.

<sup>34</sup>The Republic refused to acquiesce to joint control and manning of the police, as well as some lesser points, although they had acceded to other very major Dutch demands. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

aftermath of the first Dutch attack,commencing 20 July 1947. The TNI which up to that time had been involved in internal squabbles over the numbers of divisions and colonels,had not been able to obtain a consensus for a unified strategy. Thus when the Dutch attacked,the infantry-oriented Republican Armed Forces were positioned in a static,linear defense. The TNI had no artillery,armor or anti-tank weapons,and the Dutch attack,which was spearheaded by armored units,literally sliced through the Republic's lines of defense. With no unity of command to coordinate the battle,the Armed Forces of the Republic offered little or no resistance to the Dutch. In order to sustain any resistance the GHQ was forced to return to a decentralized command structure.<sup>35</sup> The first Dutch attack was halted only because of pressure from the United Nations and the attainment by the Dutch of the majority of their objectives.<sup>36</sup> The situation was stabilized,for a time,with the ratification of the Renville Agreement(January 17 and 19,1948).

In light of the Dutch success,the TNI realized it needed to implement some organizational changes put forward by the Hatta Cabinet,but also,more

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<sup>35</sup>Sundhaussen,op. cit.,pp.33-34;Kahin,op. cit.,pp.213-214.

<sup>36</sup>The major Dutch objectives were the seizure of the remaining ports and major cities on both Sumatra and Java. Additionally,they were able to tentatively secure the major communications links between the major cities. Kahin,op. cit.,p.213.

importantly, to develop a new strategy. The man behind this new strategy was Sudirman's new Chief of the Operational Staff, Abdul Haris Nasution, who was to become one of Indonesia's most outstanding military leaders.<sup>37</sup>

In August 1948, Nasution forwarded a letter expressing his belief in the likelihood of another Dutch attack. In this letter, he outlined how the TNI could defend the Republic's territories and ultimately defeat the Dutch. Not only guerrilla warfare tactics would be used, but in order to sustain the administration of the nation the Army would establish administrative territorial commands that would be permanent units, so that the authority of the Republican government would always be in evidence.<sup>38</sup> In order to carry-out this strategy the TNI was to be divided into two types of units. Lightly armed territorial units would be drawn from the local area, and be assigned limited combat responsibilities, mostly confined to defense of their immediate area. A second formation would be heavily armed mobile strike forces; these would be capable of striking deep into Dutch-held territory.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.37. Urip Sumohardjo had died earlier.

<sup>38</sup>A.H. Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, (Jakarta: Indonesian Army Information Service, 1953), pp.108-110.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp.111-112.

The period of the second Dutch attack(18 December 1948) was the real furnace that forged the steel of the TNI. The Republic lost a great deal of territory to the Dutch(almost all the cities) and important members of the government,including Sukarno and Hatta,were captured in the fall of Jogjakarta. However,this time the Army was better able to confront the Dutch. Generally speaking they were successful in sustaining a Republican presence in the villages and in confronting the Dutch on the battlefield. Perhaps the best example of this are the attacks on Jogjakarta,9 January and March 15,1949.<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately,it is only a matter of speculation as to how much better the Republican forces might have been had the Madiun Affair not derailed the planned reorganization of the armed forces.

### The First Rationalization Attempt

The key to the success of Nasution's new strategy was the successful reorganization of the armed forces as envisioned by both he and Mohammad

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<sup>40</sup>Kahin,op. cit.,p.395. Dr. Kahin provided me with the date of the second attack,which he informed me was led by then Colonel Suharto.

Hatta.<sup>41</sup> The concept of *rasionalisasi* was rather simple; it called for the reduction of the TNI and other *lasykar* to a grand total of 160,000 men, with the final aim of establishing a highly-trained, well-equipped standing force of 57,000 men that would form the mobile-strike units. The discharged soldiers were to be absorbed into preparation programs that would help them to re-enter civilian life productively.<sup>42</sup>

Nasution strongly backed the "rationalization" efforts of the Hatta Cabinet, i.e., efforts to reduce the size of the TNI in order to create a better soldier to weapons ratio and to increase discipline and control. Unfortunately, the "Madiun Affair" and the Dutch attack immediately following the conclusion of the incident, prevented full implementation of the rationalization program and the guerrilla strategy.

#### The Madiun Affair

The Madiun Affair has been discussed at length in other works and a great

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<sup>41</sup>See Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 261-266; and also Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 35-40. Professor Kahin pointed out to me that the reorganization concept had first been advanced by parliamentarian Zainul Baharuddin, during the period when Syarifuddin was Prime Minister (DEC 47).

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, *passim*.



deal of space will not be devoted to it here.<sup>43</sup> Suffice it to say that the uprising caught the Army and the Republic at a time when they were under a great deal of pressure from the Dutch. The Affair was declared by the Republican government to be a communist uprising, because once underway it was supported by the Communist Party leadership; however, in light of later examination the Affair appears to have been generated chiefly by officers and soldiers who were to have been discharged under the new rationalization program.<sup>44</sup>

The consequences of the Affair were far-reaching; for those troops who had remained loyal to the government, the Affair was regarded as a 'stab in the back' of the fledgling Republic. In addition, the level of the atrocities which were committed against officials and members of both sides would leave a stain that would never be erased. One other major point, was that the Affair gave the TNI leaders a reason to purge the Army's extremist leftist elements.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>See for example; Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp.290-300, 305 & 306; David Charles Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair", *Indonesia* no.21 (April 1976), pp.1-63; for a perspective from the Communist side, read D.N. Aidit, *Aidit Accuses the Madiun Affair*, (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1955).

<sup>44</sup>David Charles Anderson, *ibid.*; for the military movements and intra-military factionalism that were prevailing at the time. He states that the contest was not an attempt by the communists to overthrow the regime, but was an internal military problem revolving around the issue of centralization, specifically demobilization, a prevailing theme in the TNI's development.

<sup>45</sup>Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp.288-300; provides a very detailed account of the political maneuverings

### Darul Islam

However, there were also rightist elements in the TNI which were just as violently opposed to the concept of rationalization. This became evident after the onset of the second Dutch attack. The return to the post-Renville evacuated areas following that attack did not present a major problem except in West Java. There, the Muslim *lasykar Hizbu'llah*, and its auxiliary organization *Sabilillah* had combined in March 1948 to form the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic Army of Indonesia), under the control of a *Negara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic State of Indonesia) headed by a self-appointed *imam* (Muslim religious leader), S.M. Kartosuwirjo. The reasons for this development are basically as follows. First, the area of West Java was traditionally strongly Islamic. Second, with the withdrawal of the Republic's forces under the terms of the Renville Agreement, the people felt abandoned by their government. Third, most of the troops that remained behind were elements of the *Hizbu'llah*.<sup>46</sup>

After the withdrawal of the Siliwangi from the West Java

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concerning the affair, as well as, highlighting the feelings within the Republic.

<sup>46</sup>Kahin, op. cit., pp. 327-328.

area<sup>47</sup>, Kartosuwirjo had called upon the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* to continue to fight the Dutch. With the advent of the second Dutch attack, the subsequent fall of Jogjakarta and the capture of Sukarno and Hatta, he declared the Republic as vanquished and *Darul Islam* as now the only legitimate government. In the course of their return to West Java, the Siliwangi lost as many men to *Darul Islam* as to the Dutch,<sup>48</sup> which created a historical antipathy to extremist Islam.

In the preceding pages the internal political events that shaped the development of the TNI have been highlighted. The picture that begins to emerge of the TNI as it prepared to enter a new decade and independence can now be briefly summarized.

The structure of the TNI had changed sharply from its initial conception; it had, through rationalization, been reduced to 3 divisions on Sumatra and 4 on Java.<sup>49</sup> The TNI had also developed a central command, which while not yet in complete control of all its units, was at least able to transmit its commands fairly

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<sup>47</sup>The withdrawal was in accordance with the Renville Agreement.

<sup>48</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p.409; for a more complete examination of *Darul Islam*, pp.326-331. For an indepth examination of the political and religious factors see Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar Ul-Islam Movement in West Java(1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process", *Indonesia* no.20 (October 1975), pp.59-86.

<sup>49</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.38; he points out that this demobilization effort was far from perfect.

effectively.

The Army leadership that was forged in the Revolution was both capable, combat tested and becoming more and more politically astute. Its assumption of administrative responsibilities in the contested territories was exposing the already politically-sensitive officer corps to everyday political reality and managerial experience.

Perhaps the most important effect of the Revolution and the various attempts at civilian intervention was that the majority of its extremist elements either were purged at Madiun or defected to Darul Islam. But also a most damaging blow to Indonesia's civil-military relations was the conduct of some of the government elite in the face of the second Dutch attack. When the Dutch attacked, it was with speed and precision rapidly closing on the center of the Republican government in Jogjakarta. What caught the majority of the Republican leadership, both civil and military, by surprise was the capitulation of the government in Jogjakarta. Though the TNI had made arrangements for the security and evacuation of the members of the government, the latter had decided not to use them, and surrendered instead. This angered many in the officer corps, not the least of whom

was Sudirman himself, who felt that these leaders had deserted in the face of the enemy.<sup>50</sup>

Most officers viewed the eventual willingness of the Dutch to negotiate as a direct result of the TNI's military prowess. When it became apparent to the Dutch and the world that the Indonesian Republic would not collapse, the Security Council and the Dutch government were forced to re-evaluate Dutch policy. In combination with its conflicts with the Syahrir governments, this caused the TNI to begin developing its own ideology. Simply stated, this ideology was based on the concept that the Army was the last fortress of the state; it was the guardian of the *Panca Sila* and the Constitution.<sup>51</sup> In Sudirman's conception, the Army was an organized expression of the popular will. As the political parties agitated for power, they were threatening the cohesion of the people and thus of the Army.<sup>52</sup> As the guardian of the state, the Army had to be above factional disputes and government decisions that exacerbated these disputes.

There also emerged from this period the nucleus of what was to become the

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<sup>50</sup>Simatupang, op. cit., pp. 159-160. He describes Sudirman's attitude upon his return to Jogjakarta, and how difficult it was for him to accept the Roem-van Royen Agreement.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>52</sup>Anderson, *Java*, p. 250.

national defense strategy for Indonesia, and finally the TNI's official doctrine. The locally-based guerrilla war strategy, adopted by Nasution to confront the Dutch onslaught, would be refined and modified to fit the expanding political interests of the TNI.

There were however, long-term consequences from these changes that would follow the TNI into the next decade. First, the weakness of the headquarters would be manifested in an inability to maintain internal cohesion and unity of command. *Bapakism* remained rampant thwarting the continuing effort to rationalize the TNI's force structure. Second, the already high political sensitivity of the officer corps would combine with a deep distrust of civilian politicians. The TNI in its expanding involvement in the civilian sphere would become ever more protective over what it came to consider as its interests.

Last, the consequences of Madiun and the Darul Islam rebellion, would manifest themselves in the continued secularization of the officer corps as well as an increasing concern over both Muslim fundamentalism and Communist influence. The next chapter will examine how these problems developed, and how they were confronted after 1949 by the military leadership.

## CHAPTER THREE

### CENTRALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION

We have seen how the TNI was developing its position as the only legitimate armed force in the archipelago, but it still faced many difficulties. The Revolution had left Indonesia in a shambles. While the Outer Islands were generally better off, the island of Java was in a disastrous state. Many of the former Dutch plantations and enterprises were in such a state of disrepair or collapse as to be near-useless for the immediate economic recovery of the Republic. Many people were starving on Java as a result of the devastation attending the Dutch efforts to reassert control, while the Dutch blockade had caused a severe shortage of medical supplies, even clothing was extremely scarce.<sup>1</sup> This meant that the government had to find ways to cut other expenditures in order to meet the needs of the population. One of the first places to look for cutting costs was the military.<sup>2</sup> This issue was to assume major importance in the aftermath of the

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<sup>1</sup>Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 250-254. Kahin gives an excellent presentation of the effects of the Dutch blockade, describing, "...the large proportion of both the rural and urban populations literally dressed in rags or gunny sacks."

<sup>2</sup>Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (Englewood Cliffs:

unification of Indonesia.

According to the terms of the Round Table Conference at The Hague, which was concluded on November 2, 1949, the Archipelago was to remain as a federated state (called the United States of the Republic of Indonesia, RUSI), with the Republic only a small part of the federation.<sup>3</sup> One of the major tasks for the Republic, as the leaders saw it, was to unify the entire archipelago under their leadership. A major instrument to advance their plans was the TNI.

The Hague Agreement also had a large effect on the TNI itself. It was stipulated in the Agreement that part of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) was to be absorbed into the Royal Netherlands Army (KL), part to be discharged in Indonesia and most importantly, part was to be absorbed by the Armed Forces of the United States of Indonesia (APRIS).<sup>4</sup> This was not the only pressure placed

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<sup>2</sup>Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977). pp. 166-167; Nordlinger points out that it is economically contradictory to have a large defense budget and a developing economy. This point is even more valid when the general non-productivity of military units is concerned. Generally speaking, they contribute little to the economic development of the country.

<sup>3</sup>The federation was a creation of the Dutch, and was part of their efforts to break the resistance of the Republic during the Revolution. They hoped its maintenance would keep Indonesia tied to the Netherlands.

<sup>4</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p. 436. This was a rather difficult issue to settle, even though the TNI felt that they had won in that the absorption of the ex-KNIL soldiers was to occur under conditions to be



on the new army.

The aftermath of the Revolution saw important changes within the military itself. Most importantly, General Sudirman who had led the TNI through the war died, and a new command group was selected by the *Dwi-Tunggal* of Sukarno and Hatta. The men that they selected were ones who had been trusted by Sudirman and hopefully could be trusted by the new regime as well. General Simatupang was selected as KASAP (Chief of Staff of the APRIS), General Nasution KASAD (CoS Army), Suryadarma KASAU (CoS Air Force) and Subijakto as KASAL (CoS Navy);<sup>5</sup> all these men were KNIL trained. One last important selection was Hatta's appointment of Hamengkubuwono IX as the new Minister of Defense<sup>6</sup>, a choice initially popular with the TNI.

To understand the internal factionalization of the TNI after the Revolution it is very important to understand the basis for the disputes. Simatupang, like all the

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determined by the RUSI government. (Simatupang, op. cit., pp. 175-176.) The incorporation of the KNIL soldiers seemed to lessen the career opportunities for TNI soldiers, another irritation besides having to accept as comrades people they had been fighting for the past 4 years.

<sup>5</sup>KASAP, *Kepala Staf Angkatan Perang*; KASAD, *Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat*; KASAU, *Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara*; KASAL, *Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut*.

<sup>6</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

officers in the TNI, saw the military as having a political role, not in the sense of running a military regime, but rather as a partner with the civilian politicians. To achieve this partnership, he saw that the military's structure needed to be reorganized and its numbers reduced. Furthermore, the functions of the military needed to be clearly defined, *not by the military themselves, but by the civilian politicians* (my italics and emphasis).<sup>7</sup> This last point cannot be over-emphasized, for the primary role of a military is external defense; yet, in the years after the Revolution repeatedly the military was called upon to achieve internal stability for the new country, as the police forces available were not suited to the task.<sup>8</sup>

The TNI, or more accurately the armed forces of RUSI, were engaged in two major internal conflicts that served to accelerate the unification process and helped to involve the TNI more and more deeply in internal control and security.

The majority of the soldiers of the KNIL were Ambonese and Minahassans, and of the Christian religion. Their Dutch officers<sup>9</sup> took full

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p.53.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid. The police were not able to cope with many of the situations, because they were caused either by ex-military units or disgruntled active duty forces.

<sup>9</sup>Under the terms of The Hague Agreement the Dutch had 6 months in which to evacuate their troops (KL) from the islands, and the "reorganization of the KNIL was to be accomplished in this

advantage of the fears of some of these men, and in what was called the Westerling Affair<sup>10</sup>, raised a force of about 800 men to attempt a coup. The core of this group was a unit of KL regimental shock troops from Bandung. On January 22, 1950, Westerling attacked Bandung occupying the city briefly before being forced to withdraw under pressure from the Siliwangi Division. He then turned his attention to Jakarta, moving into position on 26 January, but again Siliwangi troops were prepared for him. He fled Indonesia on a Dutch aircraft and was arrested in Singapore.<sup>11</sup>

The Westerling Affair was an easy nut to crack when compared with the

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6 month period. This meant that there existed substantial Dutch influence in the archipelago for some time.

<sup>10</sup>Captain Paul (Turk) Westerling was a notorious KNIL officer known for his killing of a large number of civilians in the Celebes in 1946. The Ambonese and Minahassans, who were Christian, generally received a higher rate of pay than the Javanese, Sundanese and other Indonesian soldiers. The Dutch officers told them that under a Republican government they would lose their rate of pay, pensions and possibly their profession. Additionally, under a Republican government their home areas would be governed by Javanese Muslims. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 453-454.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 454-455 does not specifically identify the Siliwangi Division as responsible for the RUSI response. He does however, point out that it was the Dutch garrison commander in Bandung Major General Engels, who persuaded Westerling to withdraw. Unfortunately, he does not identify who arrested Westerling in Singapore, where he arrived after escaping to Malaya in a Netherlands military aircraft. Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 55 gives all the credit to the Siliwangi Division; it is probable that they were the troops involved, for both cities were in their area of operations.

situation in East Indonesia. In that area, the homeland of the Ambonese and Minahassans, there were almost no Republican forces, but a large number of KNIL soldiers awaiting disbandment.<sup>12</sup> When it became known that some 900 TNI troops of the RUSI forces were to be landed in Makassar, 5 April 1950, two companies of KNIL troops under Captain Andi Aziz took up positions near the harbor and with artillery forced the RUSI transports to return to the sea.

The situation rapidly deteriorated. Only with the arrival of a RUSI task force under Colonel Alex E. Kawilarang,<sup>13</sup> did the state of East Indonesia begin to crumble. Kawilarang set up a military territorial structure according to Operational Order No. 1 and fighting continued until December 1950, when the remaining troops of the insurrection evacuated to another island.<sup>14</sup> While the details of this insurrection are sketchy, the point is to show the deep involvement of the TNI, under the name of RUSI, in the internal control of Indonesia.

This activity placed the TNI in the position of policy-maker, i.e.; they were

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<sup>12</sup>The only Republican presence was an Islamic *lasykar* under the command of Kahar Muzakkar, whose operation would grow into a type of Darul Islam for South Sulawesi.

<sup>13</sup>Kawilarang was from the Bandung Academy (KMA) and additionally, was a Minahassan himself.

<sup>14</sup>Kahin, op. cit., pp. 456-460, gives a more complete picture of the conflict; Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 55-57 goes into detail concerning the military personalities involved.

constantly called upon to find answers to political questions and issues.<sup>15</sup> This situation would be further amplified in the future, as the Army continued operations under the umbrella of the *Staat van Oorlog en Beleg* or State of War and Siege.<sup>16</sup> It is not misleading to make the statement that the "army played a rather decisive role in determining the constitutional structure of Indonesia."<sup>17</sup> The obvious result of this was to drag the TNI deeper into the arena of political policy-making, further away from the concept of civilian control, a concept still supported, in general, by the ex-KNIL group of the Republican officer corps.

### RATIONALIZATION

The rationalization concept that had been developed by Nasution, and interrupted by the Revolution, was a key ingredient to the KMA graduate's

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<sup>15</sup>The continued operations of the Army under SOB required them to make the day-to-day decisions that used to be reserved for the civilians, thus they began making more and more personal connections with political friends and enemies. Up until 1957 only portions of Indonesia fell under the SOB, but after the PRRI Rebellion the entire country was subject to its jurisdiction.

<sup>16</sup>The SOB was declared in East Indonesia in April 1950 (20-22) and was lifted after the 17 October Affair, which will be discussed below. Kahin, *Nationalism*, p. 457.

<sup>17</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 57.

plans.<sup>18</sup> In order to support the TNI's external defense role, a strong centralized structure was necessary, but there were a number of obstacles facing its development:

1. The ethnic and regional identity of the Divisions made reorganization very difficult.<sup>19</sup>
2. The skill requirements across the board were not compatible with a modern army; however, since officers and men were mainly trained in guerrilla warfare.
3. The Air Force and the Navy (except for the marines) existed only on paper.
4. The TNI was basically a light infantry force, i.e.; there were no artillery, armor, combat support or combat service support units.
5. There was no indigenous weapons industry, except a rundown small arms facility in Bandung. This factor assumes a critical importance in light of the Republic's stance on strict neutrality, meaning military aid, from either East or West, had to be free from any political commitments.<sup>20</sup>

The above considerations also played a major role in the efforts of the new General Staff to develop a strategy for the nation's defense. To defend the entire archipelago would require a strong Navy and Air Force. But, to attain the proper capabilities of each respective service it was estimated that fifteen to twenty years

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<sup>18</sup>KMA is the Dutch abbreviation for the Military Cadet School in Bandung.

<sup>19</sup>This difficulty was based in the concept of *bapakism*, in which divisional units had been formed based on already established guerrilla formations, thereby forming an inter-locking network of regional and ethnic ties.

<sup>20</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.58.

was required to train a nucleus of technically proficient personnel(not to mention purchasing the equipment). The figures for a modern army were only slightly less.<sup>21</sup> This time-frame also assumed,that the government was willing to devote primary attention to the development of its armed forces. Willingly acknowledging the government's neutrality,and very aware of the stagnant economy as well as the destitution of the countryside,Nasution proposed a national defense strategy based on the land forces,namely locally based guerrilla warfare.

The reasons for the selection of a guerrilla strategy are obvious given the limitations that were imposed on the military. However,it is important to bear in mind that the concept of the Territorial Warfare Doctrine was meant to be temporary,until the Indonesians would be able to field a modern military machine.<sup>22</sup>

Basically,Nasution's concept was based upon Operational Order No.1,dated November 1948. The order established a military administration from the provincial level down to the *kecamatan*<sup>23</sup> which was to parallel the civilian

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<sup>21</sup>Nasution,*Fundamentals*,p.69.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*,pp.70-72. Its also good to keep in mind that guerrilla warfare is waged basically against the state,not in the defense of it.

<sup>23</sup>There are 4 levels of government structure in Indonesia; the

hierarchy to insure the permanence of the Republican government in the face of the Dutch onslaught. Recognizing the defensive nature of this strategy he also proposed the establishment of two types of units: territorial units for defense and mobile units for offensive actions.<sup>24</sup> These concepts were carried over in his attempts to reorganize the TNI after the Revolution.

Nasution's plans called for short-term and long-term development. Short-term development called for the establishment of an effective structure to implement the national defense strategy. This consisted of dividing Indonesia into seven Military Territories (*Tentara dan Territorium*), that were demarcated to make possible guerrilla warfare independent of the central command. This concept was reinforced by the composition of the units assigned to each Territory. The number of units (regiments) assigned to each area was determined by its strategic value, but the members of these units were to be drawn from the ethnic groups in the areas where they were based. Internally, the regiments were divided into combat units and their attendant support units, and military administration units, which were responsible for assuming complete political and administrative province (provinsi), regency (bupati), district (camat) and the town (lurah).

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<sup>24</sup>Nasution, *Fundamentals*, pp. 105-106.



control of the area in the event of an emergency.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, to increase the effectiveness of this new strategy and to remain within the new reality of the national economy, there was a planned reduction in the size of the TNI. Despite the obstacles to this move,<sup>26</sup> the size of the TNI was reduced from 500,000 to 200,000 men by 1952<sup>27</sup>. However, as in the Madiun Affair such a drastic reduction was to generate constantly recurring problems for the Army.

The long-term goals Nasution established for the Army were straightforward; the skills and education of both the officers and enlisted had to be upgraded; additionally, he recognized the need to stagger the age groupings within the Indonesian Army.<sup>28</sup> Without this effort, the goal of a modern

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<sup>25</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

<sup>26</sup>During this time period, just after the Revolution, there was considerable prestige attached to being a soldier, and a veteran was expected to receive certain material advantages along with this prestige. Additionally, the Republic was experiencing a number of insurrections which helped to preclude a reduction-in-force. Nasution, *Fundamentals*, pp. 73-76; and Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>27</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 61. See also A. H. Nasution, *Tjatatatan<sup>2</sup> Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*, (Jakarta: 1955), p. 278.

<sup>28</sup>Age was an important factor in the Army, as at the conclusion of the Revolution almost all the officer corps was in their 30's. This created difficulties in terms of both seniority and promotion, as well as combat effectiveness. The older they became the less able they would become in leading troops, particularly at the company-level. (Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 16-17)

conventional army would elude Indonesia. This was a point on which Nasution would not compromise. Officers who were reluctant to participate in the new program were warned at the end of 1950, "that those who did not meet the requirements for higher positions must be prepared to fill lower positions".<sup>29</sup> This policy, in combination with the rationalization, was to cause a major crisis within the TNI and ultimately a national crisis.

#### THE OCTOBER 17 AFFAIR

The October 17, 1952 "Affair", did not burst upon the Indonesian political scene, rather it was the consequence of long-building pressure from both within the Army and from the civilian politicians.

Essentially, the conflict was between two groups of people in government; the "administrators" who were concerned with orderly government and rational economic planning, and the "solidarity-makers" who were still swept up in the revolutionary elan and trying to legitimize the state, and, as a corollary, concerned

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<sup>29</sup>A.H. Nasution, *Tjatatan*<sup>2</sup>, (Jakarta:1955), p.320; as quoted in Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.61.

with generating the popular support necessary to sustain themselves in the parliamentary system.<sup>30</sup> Naturally enough, the Army General Staff was identified with the "administrators" (in 1952, the Wilopo Cabinet). The issue can be seen from both viewpoints; the Army HQ's concern to demobilize the soldiers on one hand, and the efforts, on the part of entrenched *panglimas* to assert regional autonomy in the face of the centralization efforts. From another point-of-view, the issue was opposition to the "administrators" efforts, and concern over the issue of civilian control of the military.<sup>31</sup>

The Wilopo Cabinet had taken several austerity measures in its program of rationalization including severely curtailing Sukarno's activities to within the framework of the constitution (thus alienating Sukarno).<sup>32</sup> The Army leaders also managed to alienate Sukarno, when they closed the Chandradimuka Military Academy in Bandung. The Academy's purpose was mainly to foster the

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<sup>30</sup> These terms were used by Herbert Feith in his famous work, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

<sup>31</sup> Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation...Part I", pp. 143-144. McVey points out in her article parliament's concern over the military's control of purchasing and acquisitions without any parliamentary oversight.

<sup>32</sup> Wilopo insisted on the President operating within the guidelines of the constitution, which up to this point in time no one had really asked Sukarno to do.

ideological training of the officer corps, Sukarno himself lecturing there on the *Panca Sila*. However, Nasution could see no need for such an establishment.<sup>33</sup> This move would have unforeseen consequences for Nasution.

The former commander of the Chandradimuka, Colonel Bambang Supeno, an ex Peta officer from East Java, and a distant relative of Sukarno, became the focal point for opposition within the Army against the GHQ. Relying on at least tacit approval from Sukarno,<sup>34</sup> Supeno entered on an active campaign against Nasution and his "uninspiring ethic of work, rational achievement and effectiveness."<sup>35</sup> Supeno's call for an emphasis on spiritual values rather than formal skills found a willing ear among ex-Peta officers, especially those in the East Java, Brawijaya Division.<sup>36</sup> This act of insubordination could not go unchallenged, and in response Nasution, as KASAD, first called upon Supeno to resign, and when that was refused relieved

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<sup>33</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.63. There are two probable reasons for this; the Academy had seen its main task as spreading the *Sapta Marga* (Seven Pledges), a set of principles based on and developed in reference to the *Panca Sila*, Nasution may have seen this a too great a influence by Sukarno and therefore a threat to his control over the Army. He may have felt that funds would be better spent on an institution to increase the professional military training of the officer corps, e.g., SESKOAD (Staff and Command College).

<sup>34</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.65 and McVey, Part I, p.145f.

<sup>35</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p.65.

<sup>36</sup>McVey, Part I, p.145 gives a very good description of his argument and appeal.

him of all duties with the warning that he was going to pursue his expulsion from the service. The parliament took up Supeno's cause, berating the Minister of Defense, Simatupang and the Army leadership for their handling of the affair. This was the kind of civilian interference that the military leadership had so opposed during the Revolution; it began to gather its forces for a counter-move.<sup>37</sup>

The situation in parliament had now taken a turn for the worse, and the military's distrust of politicians was to shape the actions of 17 October. In response to a vote for a motion to examine the "possibilities for improvements in the leadership and organization of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces"<sup>38</sup>, the group of "hawkish" reformers around Nasution took action. On 17 October, there was a huge demonstration outside the Presidential Palace attended by troops and tanks,<sup>39</sup> whose guns were turned on the Palace. After dispersing the crowd, Sukarno received a delegation of officers representing the Nasution faction, who after airing their grievances to the President, were told by

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 146.

<sup>38</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 67-68 gives a detailed description of this activity.

<sup>39</sup>After the Revolution the Dutch had maintained a military mission in Indonesia to assist in the development of the TNI. This mission was the probable source of the tanks.

Sukarno that they could expect a reaction.<sup>40</sup>

The reaction was not immediate, but its effects would haunt the TNI for years. There occurred a number of Sukarno-instigated intra-military coups, the most important of which were in East Java (Brawijaya Division), East Indonesia and South Sumatra. The loss of the Brawijaya Division's support caused a rapid erosion of Nasution's position. The final straw was the government's ouster of Simatupang and Nasution and their associates. Nasution's replacement as KASAD was Bambang Sugeng, the former commander of the Brawijaya Division.<sup>41</sup> Nasution's removal did not and would not solve the problems of the Army; the TNI was still under-funded, under-skilled and all the same age, and after the events of October, morale was at an all-time low.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Sundhaussen and McVey differ as to whether this was an attempted coup (McVey, Part 1, pp. 147-148) or subordinates (anak) petitioning the Supreme Commander (bapak) (Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 70-73). The major point here, is that it appears that Nasution at the last minute backed away from a show of force, probably because of his narrow base of support. The various *panglima* of the seven Tentara dan Territorium were installed by him, but there existed no means to insure their compliance with GHQ. Additionally, almost all the men closest to Nasution were from the Siliwangi Division, a fact that served to endear them to few members of the other Javanese Divisions.

<sup>41</sup>McVey, Part 1, p. 149-150. Sugeng was a former commander of the Brawijaya Division, until he had requested a posting overseas; his distance from the events of 17 October (he was ill) left him as an ideal compromise candidate. See also, Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>42</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 75.

Secondly, the power of the central leadership, as tenuous as it was, came to be redistributed to the regions. This meant that the power of the Army GHQ over the transfer of officers and adherence to regulations and orders was very limited.

Thirdly, with power now spread amongst the various *panglima*, the ability of the central command to lobby for the budget was drastically curtailed, and in the budgets after 1952, the income of the TNI dropped drastically, as a result of which local commanders were forced to make deals with local politicians and businessmen to maintain the capabilities of their units as well as their troops' loyalty. This intensified the corruption and entanglement with business that has continued to this day.

### THE PRRI-PERMESTA REBELLION

Between the years 1952 to 1957 the Army had for all intents and purposes fallen into disarray. The attempt to construct a strong central headquarters had failed, and in its place regional power centers had arisen and with them renewed "bapakism". The autonomy issue however, began to take a backseat in light of the

Army's post-17 October situation. Its internal factionalism had played into the hands of the government, with the result that the service's budget was nowhere near sufficient for it to maintain its troops and facilities. Additionally, under Defense Minister Iwa Kusumasumantri several personnel transfers had been effected without the consent of the Army Chief of Staff, leading to the resignation of Sugeng from that post. Now, the officer corps of the TNI sought to prevent further interference in its affairs.

The main proponent of this move for unity was the *Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia* (Republic of Indonesia Officers' Association), whose leadership was gradually coopted by Nasution and his group.<sup>43</sup> The re-installation of Nasution as KSAD (in 1955), came only after a long and trying struggle between the government and the military. His return to power was the result of a coalition of those forces which had ousted him in 1952, including the support of the Masjumi Party.<sup>44</sup> If the officer corps was looking for a weakened Nasution to take the

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<sup>43</sup>McVey, Part I, pp. 155-157. The IPRI was similar to a representative assembly for the officer corps. It was for a time an independent power center, usually in favor of those currently not in power.

<sup>44</sup>McVey touches only lightly on the political aspects of this period, but Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 79-94 gives a very detailed description of the Army's position and the government's, i.e.; Sukarno's, response. The pivotal point within the Army was the development and signing of the Jogjakarta Agreement (February 1955), which stipulated: 1) equal opportunities in military education;



reins, they were to be severely disappointed.

Nasution set about to finish the job he had started in 1950, to which he had given some thought while on non-active status. To accomplish his educational goals, he established an Inspectorate of Education and Training, with responsibility to oversee the implementation of the new program. Equally important, if not more so, was the establishment of an Inspectorate for Territorial Affairs and People's Defense. It had responsibility for the supervision and coordination of the TNI's powers in the event of a State of War and Siege (SOB), planning in the field of territorial warfare, the return to civilian life of discharged personnel and the coordination and liaison between the Army and the civilian population.<sup>45</sup> The next step was the most drastic. He moved to establish a pattern of regular transfers of senior officers to give them the widest possible experience and training, but more importantly to break the power of the

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2) Capability and skill were to be the main requirements of promotion; 3) a review of all assignments and positions held by senior officers. It also went on to deplore the "undue political influence" in the Army, the still unresolved 17 October Affair, and rather strangely, the lack of direction from the government. The document contained most of Nasution's demands when he had been KSAD, but also gave the officers a unifying position for selection of the new KSAD. Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

<sup>45</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 97.

*panglima*, some of whom were by now virtual warlords.<sup>46</sup> Three major commands were to be immediately effected by this policy, the Siliwangi Division, East Indonesia and North Sumatra. The attempts to effect these changes of command helped precipitate the PRRI-Permesta Rebellion.

The "Lubis Affair" (August-November 1956) as the events prior to the outbreak of the rebellion came to be known, was generally confined to West Java and Jakarta, but its effects would be far-reaching and help precipitate the regional insurrection.

Essentially, the affair was an attempted coup, by a group of officers who were upset with the efforts of Nasution to strengthen the central command. This discontent was tapped by Col. Zulkifli Lubis, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army,<sup>47</sup> who was slated for transfer himself. In August 1956, he gathered a group of like-minded officers to discuss the planning of a coup designed to prevent an upcoming Siliwangi Division change-of-command.<sup>48</sup> This was the most crucial of the transfers, for not only was Bandung the headquarters of the Siliwangi

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<sup>47</sup> He had been the acting KSAD until Nasution's return in 1955. Conversation with Ben Anderson, 1 April 88.

<sup>48</sup> McVey, "Post-Revolutionary...Part 1", p. 159.

Division (and near to the capital), but it was also the headquarters of most army corps, branch training installations and at that time handled the defense of the national capital.<sup>49</sup>

The attempt was a failure due to several factors, not the least of which was that the central command was aware of the operation. The failure resulted in more transfers, which continued to strengthen the KSAD's position.<sup>50</sup>

This created a sense of alarm among some senior officers who saw their positions being undermined as Nasution solidified his power. The Siliwangi Division and its regiments were rapidly coming under his control as was the RPKAD.<sup>51</sup> As Nasution locked up control at the center, the dissent to his policies

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<sup>49</sup>McVey, *ibid.*, pp. 160-161. McVey in her footnotes points out that at this time Jakarta was under the control of the Siliwangi Division, whose Regiment 7 was headquartered in the city. However, the civilian political leaders did not feel comfortable with this arrangement, and in 1960 Sukarno was able to force Nasution to create a separate divisional status for Jakarta. Since this new Jaya Division received most of its troops from the Siliwangi, efforts by the civilians to obtain a more flexible attitude, in terms of lending support to the government against the central command, on the part of the division were not successful.

<sup>50</sup>McVey, *ibid.*, pp. 162-171.

<sup>51</sup>Resimen ParaKomando Angkatan Darat: Army Parachute Regiment. The origins of the RPKAD are not clear; in conversations with Colonel George Benson, 11 JAN 88, he speculated that the unit was created as one response to the need to become a modern army, i.e.; all Western armies during World War II had developed units similar to this, therefore the TNI must have one also. An interesting note to the unit's identification; it is normally written as above, but, and this may be an

moved to the Outer Islands. The first step in the long-sought centralization of control had taken place.

The disenchantment with the GHQ was most strongly expressed by Colonel Simbolon(North Sumatra)<sup>52</sup> and Colonel Warouw(East Indonesia)<sup>53</sup>,who were in a far stronger position than Lubis to defy the GHQ.<sup>54</sup> These feelings were paralleled by similar feelings among the civilian elite and population of their respective commands.<sup>55</sup> Just as the regional military had become discontented over Nasution's policies,it was also worried about the rising influence of the Javanese. This was expressed even more strongly by the civilians,who felt that

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error,in one instance Sundhaussen(p.99) refers to it as the *Resimen Pendidikan Komando Angkatan Darat*,or Army Commando Training Regiment under the command of the Inspectorate for Education and Training.

<sup>52</sup>Simbolon had been one of the candidates for KSAD in 1955.

<sup>53</sup>I use these names only because they are most prominent,but in Sulawesi Warouw's replacement Sumual was to declare for Permesta. On Sumatra the military split with rebels LTC Ahmad Husein and Barlian taking control of Central Sumatra and South Sumatra and pro-government LTC Djamin Gintings of Medan.Sundhaussen,op. cit.,p.103.

<sup>54</sup>Not only was the central command restricted in its operational options,it had no real force to project into Sumatra Furthermore,the rebels had the monetary resources of the regions and the discontent of the political leaders and populace to rely on.

<sup>55</sup>John R.W. Smail,"The Military Politics of North Sumatra: December 1956-October 1957",*Indonesia*,no.6 (October 1968),pp.128-187. Smail gives a very good account of the interrelation of civilian and military politics,showing how the civilian political framework was coopted by the military administration to the point that it was unable to extricate itself when the situation deteriorated to the point of military action.

they were getting the short-end of the economic stick from Jakarta.<sup>56</sup> Simbolon and Warouw had become very involved in smuggling operations in order to support their troops (and thus retain their loyalty), and to help support the civilian community. Jakarta, being both physically separated and politically disconnected from the Outer Islands, was not in a position to impose its will on the PRRI or Permesta<sup>57</sup> when they declared their revolt, but neither could it afford to lose the most important economic assets of the Republic. From the point-of-view of the Army High Command, this breach in discipline was the sort of situation they had hoped to avoid by the transfer of *panglimas*, though in this instance it can be argued that Nasution was looking for a fight.<sup>58</sup>

The regional crisis came to a head in February 1958, with a rebel ultimatum to the Sukarno government, calling for the resignation of the Djuanda Cabinet and the formation of a new cabinet headed by Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta. The Indonesian government was in a precarious position, for elements of the US

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<sup>56</sup>See Barbara Harvey, *Permesta: Half a Rebellion* and Smail, *ibid.* above.

<sup>57</sup>*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia: Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia*, based on Sumatra. *Piagam Perjuangan Permesta: Charter of the Total Struggle*.

<sup>58</sup>McVey, Part I, pp. 174-175.

Seventh Fleet were stationed in Singapore, and the US had broadcast its intention of using force to rescue American citizens in the Caltex oil operation on Riau. To forestall this move, and to pre-empt US air support for the PRRI, military operations were conducted against the rebels on Sumatra beginning in March with an airdrop of the RPKAD followed by large-scale troop landings in April. The operation was planned and controlled by Colonel Achmad Yani, recently returned from the United States, who was to assume a prominent role in the TNI's continuing development. Operations in Sulawesi did not proceed as quickly as they did on Sumatra. The first action there started in the port of Donggala, with the capture of the rebel airfield, and the capital, Manado, on 26 June.

However, determined fighting continued in the interior of Sulawesi probably stimulated by the Air Force attack on Manado which caused severe loss of life and property. The strategy now pursued by Nasution, was demonstrate his military strength, but not to push the rebels to the point where they had no choice but to go on fighting. He soon offered honorable terms of surrender, and essentially succeeded in bringing the revolt to a successful reduction. But this was not to happen until 1961.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>Sundhaussen, pp. 102-111; gives a very detailed account of the political maneuvering that

The outcome of the rebellion from the central command's viewpoint was very favorable. The country had been placed under the SOB in 1957 and the Army was now able to exercise its political functions fully. This was to be enhanced by the Army's attainment of control of former Dutch enterprises. In 1957, following the United Nations' refusal to support Indonesia on the West Irian issue, Nationalist and Communist union members tried to takeover the businesses.<sup>60</sup> To preempt this move, the Army moved in and assumed responsibility for the concerns and as a result acquired permanent control over them.<sup>61</sup> This was also beneficial to the Army command, in that it gave the GHQ a wider range of options for removing less

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took place during this period (1958-1960); there is one important aspect to Nasution's strategy that will assume prominent proportions in the next chapter, i.e.; Nasution tried to point out that the GHQ was just as anti-communist as the rebels, but that it was pursuing a different strategy. For more information on the rebellions see also; Daniel F. Doeppers, "An Incident in the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion of 1958", *Indonesia* no. 14 (October 1972), pp. 183-195, who gives an account of the shooting of an American aircraft that was giving aid to the rebels; Barbara S. Harvey, *Permesta: Half a Rebellion*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1977), who gives an excellent account of the Sulawesi side of the picture and the internal political maneuvering of the Permesta Group on the island.

<sup>60</sup>Daniel S. Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), p. 33. West Irian, had remained under Dutch control after independence and was used by Sukarno as a unifying national cause. He warned the United Nations, that if they failed to support Indonesia's cause he would resort to "other means" to force the Dutch out of Irian.

<sup>61</sup>Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 38-39. SOBSI was the name for the Communist labor union.

capable officers from active duty. By offering them lucrative positions in the civilian sector, the Army made room for advancement for more capable men, yet was hoping to maintain the allegiance of the *perwira karya* through the opportunities their new positions offered.<sup>62</sup>

The Army had lost a number of good officers to the rebellion, but their removal from the Army broke the grip of the regional commanders and assured Nasution of an undisputed position in the service. As a result, his reform was strengthened, for any who opposed him (violated orders from GHQ) would be discharged from the Army.<sup>63</sup> In addition, and perhaps most important for the officer corps as a political entity, the Army's position as the guardian of the state was reaffirmed, for by maintaining the territorial integrity of Indonesia it had fulfilled its role. Last, but not least, Nasution's personal prestige both within the Army and within the civilian community was greatly enhanced by his role in dealing with the insurrection. There was only one insurrection left to extinguish.

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 39. This situation also provided the Army with an additional source of funds.

<sup>63</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 111 points out that almost all the officers and soldiers who participated in the Rebellion were discharged, while most of the senior officers, including Lubis, were incarcerated despite the amnesty offered.



## DARUL ISLAM

The last major internal problem that had to be resolved was the matter of the Darul Islam revolt in West Java and elsewhere.<sup>64</sup> The insurrection had been going on since the Revolution and actually reached its peak sometime during the period 1953-1955. Darul Islam took advantage of the PRRI-Permesta Rebellion, and the fact that the Siliwangi Division was in the process of mounting a major drive against the other rebels, to increase their activities.<sup>65</sup> Darul Islam was a major issue within the TNI for two major reasons. Ever since the military had first confronted the soldiers of the Islamic cause, they had been surprised and alarmed by the Islamic fanaticism they encountered.<sup>66</sup> Second, the conflict itself was a major drain on the Army's resources,<sup>67</sup> which eventually necessitated a

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<sup>64</sup>There was another Islamic insurrection in South Sulawesi that was loosely allied with the West Java insurrection, it was led by Kahar Muzakar, who was killed in 1964.

<sup>65</sup>Sundhaussen, *op. cit.*, p. 109. He states that the peak was reached in 1957, but this is not the case according to Professor Kahin.

<sup>66</sup>McVey, "Post-Revolutionary...Part 1", p. 139.

<sup>67</sup>Sundhaussen, *op. cit.*, p. 119n, states that only about 10% of the Siliwangi was tied up with Darul Islam in actual combat (from R.A. Kosasih), but McVey, *ibid.*, p. 139n. points out that at times units from the Diponegoro and Brawijaya Divisions were attached to the Siliwangi for duty, in order to reinforce it. These units were Raider battalions, the elite units of their respective divisions (Ben Anderson).

new approach to the problem. This led to the incorporation of a new anti-guerrilla doctrine to the older concept of Territorial Warfare.

Under LTC Suwato, the 11th Infantry Regiment (Siliwangi Division), had since 1957 been pursuing a new anti-guerrilla strategy against Darul Islam. Stationed in Tasikmalaya, in the heartland of Darul Islam, the regiment had been pursuing a strategy that combined military, economic and socio-political actions in trying to wrest the population from the rebels.<sup>68</sup> In 1958, Nasution had convened a Committee on Army Doctrine, headed by Mokoginta and Suwato, the findings of which, based in large part on the 11th Regiment's experience, were to confirm a new concept of Territorial Warfare, incorporating the anti-guerrilla doctrine, as the Army's official defense concept.<sup>69</sup> Subsequently, the doctrine was accepted by the rest of the government as the basis for the national defense. Under the auspices of Brigadier General Yani, now the Second Deputy KSAD, Suwato was placed in the *Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat* (Army Command and Staff School: SESKOAD or formally SSKAD) where he was soon to assume the role as the Army's leading ideologist.

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 138.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

This change became evident in 1962 when the TNI's concept of Territorial Warfare was laid out at the Second Seminar on Defense Problems.<sup>70</sup> Several postulates about the national defense were put forward, but four have the most importance in light of Suwanto's experience:

1. Since the active participation and support of the people is essential in guerrilla warfare, the confidence of the people must be won. Such a relationship has to be developed in pre-war times.

2. In light of the above, the Army must take an interest in the material welfare of the villagers.

- a). The national consciousness of the villager has to be built-up through political education.

- b). In return for the villagers' sacrifice, the Army must provide political stability, internal security and social justice.

3. Simultaneously, specially trained units should be assigned to build the basic structure of the war-time administration and to prepare the people for the new strategy.

4. The Army must have a greater say in the national economy; without a strong economy the military will remain ill-equipped and unable to carry out aid programs to the masses or develop a war-time logistics system.

This doctrine was not to cause any great policy changes in the Army, for it had been pursuing these aims since 1957. What it did do was to proclaim publicly the Army's intentions and its right to a prominent position in Indonesian politics

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 140, the following information comes from Sundhaussen's work.

and national life. In response to the doctrine the Army organized Civic Action Programs on the Siliwangi model on a nation-wide scale. In essence, the Army was now in an excellent position to continue its dominance of the countryside, in the face of increasing PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) pressure, even after the lifting of martial law in May 1963.<sup>71</sup>

The development of the TNI to this point has been traced solely from an internal perspective. The composition of its officers has been examined and shown to be the foundation for the political activism of the officer corps in general. This activism established a set of boundaries to prevent civilian interference in the affairs of the Army, and the Army has since always taken steps to maintain those boundaries.

The initial Army Conference in Jogjakarta, the 3 July Affair, the 17 October 1952 Affair, even the stance of the officer corps to the reinstatement of Nasution are all examples of the TNI's efforts to assert its independence, and in a wider sense its right to participate in politics.

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<sup>71</sup> Parts of Indonesia, and occasionally all of the country, had been under martial law since independence. Crouch, op. cit., pp. 32-34 and Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 129.

The Army's continued operations under martial law led it to become the governing authority in much of Indonesia. Whether it was unifying the new Republic or quelling rebellion, it increasingly established its own form of rule alongside that of the civilian government. As a result of the Madiun Affair and the success of the revived PKI in the 1955 elections, and the bitter war against Darul Islam and the PRRI/Permesta, this military government was increasingly anti-communist and if not anti-Islamic, extremely wary of the fanaticism of fundamentalist Islam.

These factors would have a great bearing on the Republic in the years after the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion, as the Army faced the challenge of the rise of the PKI.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The Indonesian Army's development did not go unaided. Both the United States, the Soviet Union and to a limited extent Communist China, gave military aid to the Indonesian armed forces. However, what is most interesting, is the fact that the total amount of US military aid provided, was substantially less than the Soviet commitment. Considering the strategic importance that Washington placed on the Indonesian archipelago, this lack of funding needs some explanation, as does the remarkable success of the US government's meager effort. The success of the US in Indonesia, ultimately hinged on the training of the Indonesian Army's officer corps. In order to gain a complete understanding of the importance of this connection, what needs to be examined first, is how the Indonesian government, and specifically the Army, were seen from both Washington and from the American Embassy in Jakarta. What will be drawn out are the personalities and attitudes of the main players of this very important period in Indonesian

history, and how these players influenced the development of the Indonesian Army. This will then be expanded by examining the programs through which military aid to Indonesia was channeled, and finally what effect these factors had on the Indonesian Army.

### Overview

The importance of Indonesia to United States foreign policy in the 1950's was quite small. Other issues were consuming the attention of both the White House and the Congress. During the early 1950's the major preoccupations of the Eisenhower Administrations were, aside from relations with the USSR, the Korean Conflict, the French collapse in Indochina and various domestic issues. The state of relations was further strained by the PKI's powerful position in Indonesian politics and by the bad personal relationship between Sukarno and the Eisenhower Administration.<sup>1</sup> The situation became extremely strained over

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<sup>1</sup>Though Sukarno made a visit to Washington, in 1956, and repeatedly extended invitations to Eisenhower to visit Indonesia (5 times) he was just as repeatedly put off. The two men just did not get along. According to former Ambassador Allison, Sukarno was seen as a Communist and a playboy, and Eisenhower was not going to do anything that would build up Sukarno's prestige among the Indonesian people. John M. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison*

the issue of the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion. The CIA's painting of the rebels as anti-Communist and nearly everyone else as Communist or potential Communist, plus the US government's clandestine support of PRRI/Permesta, exacerbated the tensions between the two countries almost to the breaking point. But the entrance of the Kennedy Administration into the White House held out the promise of a new beginning for Indonesian-United States relations. Kennedy's speeches and rhetoric held an appeal for Sukarno, this plus Jones' awareness that there were personnel changes in the offing in Washington contributed to the feeling that the tense state of relations was about to be relieved.<sup>2</sup>

Relations between the US and Indonesia, from the Washington point-of-view, revolved around four major issues from 1960-1965; the settlement of the Western New Guinea (West Irian) dispute, the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the spreading influence of the PKI and last, but not least, Sukarno himself.

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*Wonderland*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 311-314.

<sup>2</sup>Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), pp. 174-194.



With the implementation of Guided Democracy in 1959, the Eisenhower Administration came to view the Indonesian government as increasingly pro-Communist, an attitude that was not conducive to more congenial relations. In fact, an Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Committee had been established, some time in 1958, to develop possible suggestions to prevent a Communist takeover from occurring. The committee developed three suggestions; first, to strengthen and encourage the anti-Communist forces in the Outer Islands, so that they could affect favorably the situation on Java, and provide a rallying point if the Communists did take over there. Second, if the situation in Java continued to deteriorate, to move more quickly on the first recommendation. Third, the embassy should use whatever leverage was available, or could be built-up among the anti-Communist forces on the Outer Islands, to stimulate to action the same forces on Java.<sup>3</sup> However, fortunately for Indonesia cooler heads prevailed; these were mostly to be found in the US Embassy. The leader of the embassy effort to thaw relations was the ambassador, Howard P. Jones.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Allison, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

<sup>4</sup>Allison, op. cit., pp. 307-315. Though Ambassador Allison was only assigned to Indonesia for a short period of time, 11 months (1957-1958), he developed an understanding and appreciation of the Indonesian people and their desires that was missing in Washington. His particularly frustrating

Jones' assumption of the ambassadorship in 1958 was not his first tour in Indonesia, previously he had been the head of the economic aid mission, from 1954-1956. During his first tour he had developed a great affection for the country and her peoples, an affinity that was to help counteract the increasingly difficult state of relations between the two countries. Jones did not agree with Washington's policy towards Indonesia. As is very evident throughout his book, he agreed with and supported the goals of the policy, i.e., an Indonesia free and non-Communist, but he did not endorse Washington's strategy, i.e., covert support of the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion.<sup>5</sup>

When Ambassador Jones assumed his position, Indonesia was in the midst of the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion. While the US was publicly espousing a policy of neutrality, it was covertly supplying military aid to the rebels. Within a short period of time Jones came to realize that both Washington's view, and its handling, of the situation were not correct, and he was advising Washington that the Indonesian Army was more and more likely to determine the future of Indonesia, and that if it

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Indonesian experience is described on pages 293-344, but the above referenced pages detail his specific frustrations with the Dulles brothers, the CIA Station Chief and overall Washington policy.

<sup>5</sup>Jones, op. cit., p. 121.

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
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
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remained anti-Communist it could be counted on to prevent a Communist takeover.<sup>6</sup> This was advocating a serious about-face for American policy, and it was only in the aftermath of the Pope Incident, and the concurrence of the American military that the policy was altered.<sup>7</sup>

Though Jones saw Sukarno in a generally favorable light<sup>8</sup>, throughout his tour he supported US efforts to maintain the anti-Communist posture of the Indonesian Army.<sup>9</sup> His difficulty lay in persuading Washington that the two positions were compatible. There were powerful forces within Washington, most

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<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p.127. Jones was not the originator of this idea, Allison before him had forwarded the same idea. Much later during Jones' tenure, Guy Pauker had formulated a similar hypothesis; see, Guy Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia", in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp.185-230.

<sup>7</sup>Jones, pp.142-147. Though he does not come out and state that this was the effect of the Pope Incident, it is very evident from these pages that the dichotomy in US policy forced Washington to play by Jones' suggestions. Apparently, the policy change had occurred about 4-5 days before the incident (Conversation with Dr. Kahin, 1 APR 88). The incident in question was the downing of an unmarked aircraft, which had been supporting the rebels. The pilot was an American with a complete set of identification papers, including membership at the Clark Air Base Officers Club. Col. Benson appears to have been largely responsible for helping to shift the attitude of the Pentagon on Indonesia. Conversations with Col. Benson.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.47-63. These pages are full of the fond memories of a man with whom Jones had shared a deep sense of friendship.

<sup>9</sup>At the height of the West Irian dispute he advocated supplying the Army with arms aid, to underline US confidence in Nasution and the Army. But, Nasution was turned down during his October 1960 arms-buying visit to Washington. (Jones, op. cit., p.189.)

notably Congress, which saw Sukarno as an ardent Communist, and thus any aid to Indonesia as supporting Communism. They were deeply concerned by the beginnings of the PKI's active push for land reform, by its development and training of cadres to go to the villages, and later on by its pushing of the *aksi sepihak* or unilateral action campaign.<sup>10</sup> They argued that if Sukarno was not a Communist why would he permit the PKI to operate so openly, and if the Army was really anti-Communist why was it not actively opposing the PKI?

The situation was further exacerbated by the launching of the "Crush Malaysia" campaign on 13 February 1963. Opposing the formation of Malaysia as a British imperialist ploy, Sukarno, with the support of the PKI and some elements of the military, began armed operations against Malaysia through Borneo. While some officers supported the campaign as a crusade against a Chinese Communist initiative in Southeast Asia,<sup>11</sup> many senior leaders saw it as a

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<sup>10</sup> *Aksi Sepihak* or unilateral action, refers to the period 1963-1965 when the PKI's efforts at instituting the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law moved into the arena of physical confrontation with the landowners and ultimately the Army. For more information on this issue see; Rex Mortimer, *The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform 1959-1965*, Australia: Monash University, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 1, 1972.

<sup>11</sup> Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 59. This wording is perhaps too strong, but there were officers who feared that the large Chinese populations in Malaysia, and Singapore especially, would draw the new nation into the orbit of Communist China. But, one must remember also that at this same time Malaysia was fighting a

justification for maintaining a large army, while others worried that it would disperse army strength from politically crucial Java.

As the campaign wore on, Jones saw the Army in a "no win" situation; as dangerous as the escalating campaign was, the military could not afford to oppose Sukarno and lose ground to the PKI.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, Jones argued, the Indonesian Army and the United States basically saw eye-to-eye on the requirements for maintaining a "free and independent" Indonesia; so that Jones felt, the TNI could be counted on to restrain Sukarno from going to extremes.<sup>13</sup>

Ambassador Jones persisted with this line-of-reasoning throughout his tour; contending that despite Sukarno's actions, it was unwise to abandon such strong anti-Communist elements as the Army and the MOBRIG. The maintenance of US assistance to these groups would fortify them for the inevitable showdown with the PKI.<sup>14</sup> Jones support of the Army went far deeper than he admits to in his autobiography, for in early March 1964, in a conversation with General

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Communist insurgency itself.

<sup>12</sup>Jones, op. cit., pp. 269-271.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 312.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 324-325.

Nasution, he was cautioning him on the impact of Confrontation on Indonesia and the rise of the PKI. In addition, he was inquiring about the possibilities for a coup against Sukarno and hinting at US support of such a move.<sup>15</sup>

Throughout 1964 and 1965, and especially after the 17 August 1964 "Go to hell with your aid!" Independence Day speech by Sukarno, Jones had an uphill battle to maintain even reduced levels of US aid to Indonesia.<sup>16</sup> However, he was not alone in his efforts to win Washington support for Indonesia, he had a very valuable assistant in the person of his military attaché, Colonel George Benson.

Colonel Benson first came to Indonesia as an assistant military attaché from October 1956 to July 1959. During that time period the two senior officers with whom he worked were relieved and from 1957 until sometime around mid- to the end of 1958, Colonel (then Major) Benson was the only US Army officer in Indonesia. This point cannot be over-emphasized, for it was during this period that the close ties between Benson and the Indonesian military leadership were

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<sup>15</sup>DDRS(75) 117C; Cable from Jones to the Secretary of State(6MAR64). Jones came to three conclusions from his meeting, but the last point is most interesting; he stated: "He(Nasution) avoided like the plague any discussion of possible military takeover, even though this hovered in the air throughout talk, and at no time did he pick up obvious hints of US support in time of crisis."

<sup>16</sup>Jones, *Possible Dream*, pp.324-325; p.345 and pp.363-364.



developed.<sup>17</sup>

In many ways Colonel Benson was a typical US Army officer. A graduate of the US Military Academy near the top of his class, he was assigned for combat duty in Korea and was one of his class's first battalion commanders. In 1954-1955, he attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, where one of his classmates was Candra Hasan.<sup>18</sup> He also briefly met then Colonel Ahmad Yani, who was preparing to enter the CGSC class of 1955-1956.<sup>19</sup> After completion of CGSC, Benson then took language training and the attaché's course before beginning his assignment in Indonesia.

This first assignment was to be the most crucial one for both the standpoint of the Indonesian military and Colonel Benson. The close ties that he developed with the leadership--Generals Nasution, Yani, Mokoginta and Kartakusumah

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<sup>17</sup>Conversation and correspondence with Colonel George Benson, 11JAN88 and 4-5FEB88 respectively.

<sup>18</sup>Candra Hasan had been an ally of Nasution's, trying to negotiate with Warouw after his assumption of power in the wake of the "17 October Affair". For a short period of time he headed SUAD I (Intelligence), but was fired and replaced by Sukendro on 13DEC56. He disappeared from sight after this and did not surface again until the 1980's in connection with the retired officers protests against the Suharto regime.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

among others--were to shape not only his career, but the development of the TNI. This trust was cemented during the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion; Benson did not agree with the CIA's position on the Rebellion, and this fact coupled with his lack of knowledge about the Agency's activities as well as his support of the Indonesian General Staff's position to Washington created a bond that was enduring.<sup>20</sup> Benson related that in the planning for the Sumatran operations, the TNI General Staff (*Staf Umum Angkatan Darat* or SUAD) lacked the necessary maps of Sumatra. General Yani telephoned Benson asking him if the embassy had the required maps, and if so could he please get them now? Now was around midnight, according to Benson, but he took the maps to Yani and the staff, who were working out their plans in a private home. Benson said he stayed for several hours listening to the conversation and then departed.<sup>21</sup>

Benson's achievements did not go unnoticed in Washington, for at that time the US Army Chief of Staff was General Maxwell Taylor. General Taylor had been viewing the developments in Indonesia with some interest, one of the reasons being that the military attaché's reports conflicted with the CIA. Benson had been

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.; Benson told me that on the occasion of his second tour in Indonesia, he was requested by both Gen Nasution and Gen Yani, and for his third tour by Ambassador Galbraith.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

telling the Pentagon that the rebellion was not one of non-Communist versus Communist, but rather had split the non-Communist faction in Indonesia, pitting them one against the other.<sup>22</sup> This position was rendered more plausible by the fact that the leadership of the central government's force was all US trained, while none of the rebels had any US training.<sup>23</sup> The crucial turning point came on the issue of a weapons purchase;<sup>24</sup> when his request for arms was turned down by the Pentagon, Nasution asked Benson to see if this also meant that the training of Indonesian officers in the US was to be halted. General Taylor's reply was that the US Army would train every officer that the Indonesian Army would make available. Benson's efforts were considered so outstanding by General Taylor, that the Army Commendation Medal for his performance during this

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.; it also did not hurt that Ambassador Jones was supporting and promoting the same position through State Department channels. (Jones, op. cit., pp. 118-121.)

<sup>23</sup>Alex Kawilarang, Lubis, Simbolon, Husein were in Sumatra, while Warouw and Sumual were in Sulawesi. None of these men had any US training. On the other hand, the GHQ consisted of Yani, Rachmat Kartakusumah, Achmad Mokoginta and Chandra Hassan among others, who were all US trained. Current Military Data for Indonesia, Bunnell Notes all available from the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project and a listing of Indonesian officers who attended the US Army's Command and General Staff College.

<sup>24</sup>Nasution had gone to Washington in 1960 to request a large arms purchase but, he was turned down and ultimately was forced to get them from the Russians.

tour, was personally upgraded by the Chief of Staff to a Legion of Merit; quite an honor for a Major, as the Legion is generally reserved for officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or higher.<sup>25</sup>

Colonel Benson returned to serve Indonesia from August 1962 to July 1965, at the request of Generals Nasution and Yani, as Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Civic Action. This period was especially crucial for the Indonesian Army, as it was beginning to be openly confronted by the PKI in the villages (through the unilateral action campaign) and it needed to get out of the barracks to meet the PKI on even ground.<sup>26</sup> The selection of Colonel (then Lieutenant Colonel) Benson for the position was excellent, for the Indonesian Army leadership trusted him and in return he was given almost autonomous control over the conduct of the civic action program in Indonesia.<sup>27</sup> It also helped that Colonel Benson and Ambassador Jones got along very well, and that the ambassador was in full support of the program as the US' only remaining tool to help support the Army against the PKI.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Benson, correspondence 11 JAN 88.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Civic Action Briefing by Col. Benson from the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project; courtesy Dr. Ben Anderson.

<sup>28</sup>Benson, conversation 4-5 FEB 88.

Benson obviously played an important role in helping to further US interests, but this role could not have been played without his connections on the TNI General Staff. Perhaps his most important connection was with the future KSAD (*Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat* or Chief of Staff of the Army), Ahmad Yani, for it was Yani who was to lead the Indonesian Army into modernization.

General Yani was the man of the future for the Indonesian Army. He had commanded troops from the company to the battalion level and above, he was well respected by the soldiers both because of this and because he could speak to them effectively, and he was well-educated in his profession.<sup>29</sup> According to Colonel Benson, Yani was ideal for the position of KSAD; he looked the part, i.e.; he was physically fit, his appearance in uniform was immaculate, he was professionally competent and he was politically astute.<sup>30</sup>

Upon his return from Leavenworth (CGSC), Yani was assigned as to head SUAD II, as Operations Officer for the General Staff. It was from this position that he began his reform of the Indonesian Army's educational system and planned

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.; see also Ibu A. Yani, Ahmad Yani: Sebuah Kenang-kenangan, (Bandung: P.T. Indah Jaya, 1981), pp. 165-167.

and executed the central government's operations against the PRRI/Permesta rebels.

It was not however, until after he was made the *KSAD*, in 1962, that he began an all out effort to modernize the Indonesian Army. Yani's efforts at modernization can be seen most readily in the educational system of the Army, but he also had a significant impact on the development of the mobile-strike forces that were the offensive component of Nasution's, and the Army's, Territorial Doctrine.<sup>31</sup> An excellent example of this is the formation of the KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Command). While Yani did not command it himself, he was in strong support of it for it enhanced the striking power of the Army throughout the archipelago.<sup>32</sup> Yet, for all his interest in the mobile-strike units, Yani did not neglect the foundation of TNI strategy, i.e., the territorial units. Like Nasution, he understood that the Army needed to get into the villages to compete with the Communists, and made great

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<sup>31</sup> Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military: 1945-1965*, (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978), pp. 50-53 (Part II). He gives the impression that Nasution and Yani were widely divergent on this issue. However, Benson in conversation with me gave the impression that this development in the Indonesian Army did not go unnoticed and was not unfavorably received by the Pentagon.

<sup>32</sup> Benson, correspondence 11 JAN 88. The KOSTRAD is the descendant of the Army General Reserve (CADUAD) which was formed in August 1961 from the Irian Battle Command. (McVey, "Transformation... Part 2", 176.

efforts to get the aid and equipment necessary to accomplish this mission.<sup>33</sup>

While all these events were taking place in Indonesia, there was a group of bureaucrats and politicians in Washington, who were working just as diligently to try and realize Jones' goals. These men came to the forefront with the new Kennedy Administration, and while several people were involved their names and positions should serve to highlight how the embassy's goals were realized.

Perhaps the most important players, at least from the point of Ambassador Jones were the new faces in the State Department, especially the Far East Bureau. Within the State Department, was the new Assistant Secretary for the Far East, Averell Harriman, who enthusiastically supported the idea of an Indonesian MAP. Harriman also hand-picked the President's new National Security Council Assistant for the Far East, Michael Forrestal. In the FE bureau there was Robert

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<sup>33</sup>DDRS(RC) 562D; Cable from Embassy(14SEP62), re: "Conversation between Yani and Benson reference CAP". According to Benson, Yani stated that Nasution did not understand the program; Yani wanted to train key officers in civil affairs and economic development at the University of Pittsburgh. Benson continued, that Yani believed that the Army could carry the villagers if it showed it could produce results, not promises like the PKI. Benson concluded that Yani's concept was "right out of the book". This is not to imply that the Army was not in the villages after 1963. Rather, with the lifting of martial law in 1963, the Army no longer had any explicit tasks there, while the civilians were making major efforts to regain their lost positions.

Lindquist and Jim Bell both fervent supporters of Ambassador Jones. These men were all linked with the Pentagon through the efforts of one man, James Rafferty, who was the Indonesian desk officer in the Department of Defense's International Security Agency (ISA). His boss in ISA was William Bundy, brother of the Secretary of State, McGeorge Bundy.<sup>34</sup>

The last link in the Washington group was General Maxwell Taylor, who was at one time the Chief of Staff of the US Army (CSA), and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). While he was serving in those positions, he had the opportunity not only to survey events in Indonesia, but on occasion made his interest known. An active backer of civic action since the Korean War, he was very influential in maintaining the US Army's connection with the Indonesian Army, through both Colonel Benson and his counterpart General Nasution. With the players clearly delineated, it is now possible to look at how the Military Assistance Program to Indonesia operated.

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<sup>34</sup>Bunnell Notes, The Kennedy Initiative in US Army-TNI Relations, pp. 3 & 20-28. These papers were lent to me by Dr. Ben Anderson of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.



### Aid to the Indonesian Army

Before it is possible to assess the impact of US training on the Indonesian Army, it will be useful to understand how pervasive military aid was to the TNI. The US government, and specifically the US Army, did not suddenly enter into an aid program with the Indonesian Army in the late 1950's. A modest US assistance effort had been on going since the late 1940's to the national police force, especially the MOBRIG, and to the fledgling air force (in the early 1950's).<sup>35</sup>

This interest with Indonesia was to intensify over the next decade, but the years prior to 1958, and the West Irian dispute, were still relatively low key. The years 1952-1954 saw the National Security Council expressing its concern to prevent Communist influence and infiltration and to strengthen the non-Communist elements within the Indonesian government. One of the key

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<sup>35</sup> Mrazek, op. cit., p. 92. Declassified Documents Reference Service (Hereafter referred to as DDRS), followed by (brackets) with the year group of the document in the (brackets). DDRS(79) 33A; This is a staff study from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 16 JAN 50, which covers the general area of China. Essentially, it notes that with the loss of China to the Communists, the best way to maintain the rest of Southeast Asia was thorough a program of military assistance. It further states that a good foundation for resisting Communism can be laid in Indonesia and recommends the approval of \$5 million for the Indonesian constabulary (this is the original term used in the document).

prerequisites to this effort however, was that the United States had to avoid all appearance of interference in Indonesian affairs.<sup>36</sup> The assistance was therefore provided largely in the form of military training for Indonesian officers, a program that very early on was seen to offer great potential for increasing US influence in Indonesia.<sup>37</sup> This potential was further underlined in 1956, in an NSC Progress Report which pointed out that out of the 35 officers trained in the US, 30 were from the Army and of those thirty, four held key positions on the General Staff (SUAD).<sup>38</sup>

It was not until 1958 however, that a more overt interest in Indonesia began to develop within the US government. The events that caused this heightened interest were the onset of the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion (1958), the imposition of Guided Democracy (1959) and the escalation of the West Irian dispute. The event

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<sup>36</sup>DDRS(79) 46A; NSC Report, dated 19JUN52, "Courses of Action, reference Indonesia"; DDRS(77) 196B; NSC Report(10NOV53), "Objectives and Courses of Action for Indonesia"; DDRS(81) 488A; NSC Report(4AUG54), "Policy Objectives for the Far East".

<sup>37</sup>DDRS(82) 001192; NSC Progress Report on NSC Decision 171/1 (Policies and Courses of Action in Indonesia), dated 12JUL54, concludes that the easiest way to extend US influence was through the training of Indonesian officers in US Service Schools. To lessen the financial burden on the Indonesian Armed Forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) was considering giving the Indonesians free transport on US military aircraft.

<sup>38</sup>DDRS(82) 001194, NSC Progress Report(10OCT56).

that came to highlight the importance of the Indonesian Army however, was the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion.

According to Ambassador Jones, he came to view the revolt not from Washington's point-of-view, but rather as a split within the anti-Communist factions.<sup>39</sup> The US military attache was advocating the same line, trying to convince the DOD that they should support the Indonesian Army.<sup>40</sup> Ambassador Jones went even further in his assessment of the situation; in his memoirs he states that he told Washington that in terms of power politics, in order to settle the rebellion improve relations with Indonesia, and influence her toward more constructive policies both internally and externally the US must place its bets on the Indonesian Army.<sup>41</sup> He cabled the Department of State, April 15, 1958, to urge the US to make a tangible gesture of commitment to the Indonesian Army in order to support the pro-American, anti-Communist top officer group, specifically he urged: 1) that the US deliver on the Indonesian request for military

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<sup>39</sup>Jones, op. cit., pp. 118-121.

<sup>40</sup>Correspondence with Col. Benson dated 11 January 1988, conversation 4-5 February 1988. Benson pointed out that he felt one of the turning points for DOD's attitude was the split between the US-trained and non-US trained officers; the former all being on the government's side and the latter on the rebels.

<sup>41</sup>Jones, op. cit., p. 126.

equipment,<sup>2</sup>)that the DOD invite the Army's top officers to the Pentagon for a discussion of that request,<sup>3</sup>)that Indonesian officers be offered attendance at the US Army's Command and General Staff College(CGSC) and that additional training be offered for officers and NCOs,<sup>4</sup>)and finally that parachutes be provided the Army.<sup>42</sup>

According to the Col. Benson,the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion was a turning point for the DOD's attitude and outlook towards Indonesia. When Gen. Nasution had the opportunity to visit Washington,he and Gen. Maxwell Taylor,Chief of Staff of the Army,got along like two long lost friends.<sup>43</sup> This relationship bore fruit,for in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,the Joint Chiefs of Staffs made several recommendations for military aid to Indonesia. In a comment on the Token Military Aid Program,<sup>44</sup>which had been implemented to assist the Indonesian Army as the only non-Communist force with the capabilities to obstruct the PKI,the Chiefs insisted that if given encouragement in the form of

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid.,p.127.

<sup>43</sup>Benson,11JAN and 4-5FEB.

<sup>44</sup>Apparently the this program was the special airlift of military equipment to Indonesia from 15-29AUG 1958,immediately after the US and Indonesia made up for the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion.(Jones,op. cit.,pp.148-154). Jones states that after six months the US had succeeded in re-equipping 21 infantry battalions,about 16,000 men.(ibid.)

aid, Nasution would carry-out his plan for control of the Communists. The JCS advised that the program be maintained, as it had already achieved its limited objectives and the momentum thus generated had to be maintained.<sup>45</sup>

This about-face of the US Army was not solely due to the efforts of Col. Benson and Ambassador Jones. There were two other underlying factors to this decision. The most compelling of these was the burgeoning Soviet aid effort in Indonesia. This effort on the Soviets part was made all the easier by the US' refusal of aid on the grounds of "neutrality" concerning the rebellion, plus the fact that the sinking of the Indonesian Navy's flagship (May 18, 1958) and the bombing of Ambon the same day, were linked to US assistance to the rebels.<sup>46</sup> The first shipment of Soviet aircraft arrived on May 6, 1958 and heralded what was to become an extensive relationship between the Indonesian Air Force and Navy and the Soviet military.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>DDRS(82) 002386; "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, re: Token Military Aid Program for Indonesia (22SEP58)". The JCS also recommended the prompt completion of the original program in its entirety; the approval of an augmented program (which had been forwarded on 23 and 31 JUL 58); the early determination of a permanent Military Assistance Program for Indonesia.

<sup>46</sup>The link was made with the subsequent capture of Pope after the attacks.

<sup>47</sup>The Soviet Union virtually equipped both services. This aid plus the extensive training required to operate the equipment, gave them substantial influence in those services.

The other factor that contributed to the new US position was the performance of the Indonesian Army during the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion. When the Pentagon inquired sarcastically, how the Indonesian Army was going to cross the Straits to Sumatra and land troops, the military attache responded that if they had to use every ship in the archipelago and lash together rafts from logs and empty oil drums, they would make the assault.<sup>48</sup> On the heels of the TNI's successful operations, the US Navy's Chief of Intelligence made a visit to Jakarta, and confirmed Ambassador Jones's conclusion that the Indonesian military leadership was the key to her internal political situation, and that the US must show tangible support for the army leadership.<sup>49</sup> This was followed in July, by a report from the Naval attache which asserted that the impact of US training on the Indonesian officer corps was underestimated. He continued by describing the success of the program with the Indonesian Army and insisting that

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<sup>48</sup>Benson, 4-5 FEB. The Indonesians had been counting on the use of the Dutch KPM fleet however, after the takeover of Dutch interests in the area, the fleet was withdrawn. As a result, the Indonesian military had to scramble to find ships, which they finally did, buying them from Poland and the USSR (Conversation with Dr. Ben Anderson). See also, lev, op. cit., p. 35. Mrazek, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 173-175 and Part 2, p. 20; he states that the performance of the American-trained officers came as quite a surprise, the more so when it was realized that it was American tactics and doctrine that had been used in executing the operations.

<sup>49</sup>Jones, op. cit., p. 147. The date of the visit was 8 MAY 58, by then Chief Admiral Frost.

the effects of this type of effort were significant. He concluded his cable by stating that US priority objectives be aid to the Army in order to achieve control of the Communists, help the economy and influence political changes.<sup>50</sup>

These efforts met with success. In January 1959, approval by the National Security Council of an augmentation to the Token Military Aid Program was secured. It also came to be more clearly recognized in Washington that the key to US efforts to curtail Communist influence in Indonesia was the Army.<sup>51</sup> Even in 1960, as the West Irian dispute was heating up and Nasution's request for further aid was turned down, Washington recognized the need to maintain some form of military assistance.<sup>52</sup> In an NSC Report, dated 19 December 1960, the Indonesian Army's position as the principle obstacle to Communism was

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<sup>50</sup>DDRS(82) 002387; Cable from the Naval Attache's visit to Jakarta to CINCPAC, dated 13JUL58. The cable is from an attache, presumably, in the US Embassy in Australia to Major General Harris. Additional emphasis is mine.

<sup>51</sup>DDRS(84) 001980; NSC Report 5901(16JAN59). This document approved the augmentation; additionally, it attributed the anti-PKI stance of the Army to US training of its officers, who now occupied responsible positions and exerted strong influence in orienting the Army to the West and the US. It recommended an expansion of US training of Indonesian officers and efforts to curtail Sino-Soviet bloc training programs.

<sup>52</sup>The US government did not want to provide substantial arms assistance to Indonesia because it could have been used against its NATO ally, the Netherlands, in West Irian. As a consequence of this decision, Nasution was forced to turn to the Soviet Union which not only supplied the Army, but issued a very impressive package to all the services, in January 1961.

reasserted, and this position was credited to the training that several hundred Indonesian officers had received in US Army schools. The report continued by stating that the influence of this training was one of the factors that allowed the US to influence Indonesia. It concluded by recommending that the ties between the US and the Indonesian Police and military be maintained and strengthened; it went on to recommend an increase in their capabilities to maintain internal security and to combat Communism, and continuing aid in the form of arms, equipment and training on a limited basis.<sup>53</sup>

With the end of the Eisenhower Administration, the Indonesian government and the American Embassy gave a sigh of relief. The entry of the Kennedy Administration seemed to both to promise a new beginning in relations. Ambassador Jones was quick to realize this opportunity, and wasted no time in sending a cable to Washington suggesting a complete reassessment of United States policy and courses of action in Indonesia.<sup>54</sup> He followed this in March with a current assessment of the US' military aid policy to Indonesia, and a

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<sup>53</sup>DDRS(82) 000592; "NSC Report #6023: Policy on Indonesia(19DEC60)".

<sup>54</sup>DDRS(77) 125A; Cable from Ambassador Jones to the Secretary of State dated 26 and 28 January 1961.



proposal for a full scale MAP not tied to a mutual security pact. He asserted that since the fundamental purpose in providing this aid was political,i.e.; strengthening the anti-Communist leadership,the US had to recognize that decisions on equipment "must be based on Indonesia's own concepts of roles and missions,which are not confined to internal security alone."<sup>55</sup>

These entreaties from Jakarta did not fall on deaf ears in Washington. In May 1961 there was a recommendation from the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense,William P. Bundy,to the Special Assistant to the President,Ralph A. Dungan,that the US restart the 1957 aid program,with the largest portion of it going to the Army,and token amounts to the Air Force and Navy so that the Army was not seen,too clearly,as the instrument of US policy.<sup>56</sup>

This tone was to pervade the direction of US policy with Indonesia throughout the Kennedy years,and to a lesser extent under the Johnson

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<sup>55</sup>DDRS(77) 125C; Cable from Jones to the Secretary of State,7 March 1961. This is a four page document that essentially boils down to,"if we wish to offset the huge Soviet aid program to Indonesia,we do not need to match them dollar for dollar,but only show the Indonesians that we are willing to treat them with more than token respect." Emphasis is mine,above.

<sup>56</sup>DDRS(75) 154C;memo dated 17MAY61. After 1955,Indonesia had informed the US it did not need our assistance,then in 1957 they requested the program to restart,but since they would not sign a mutual assistance agreement,the program was conducted as a token sales program. For example,in FY'59 the US was to provide \$21 million in return for only \$700,000 in payment.

Administration. It was agreed that the Army was the key to maintaining a non-Communist Indonesia, but the West Irian dispute, *Konfrontasi*, and finally Sukarno himself were to prove formidable obstacles to overcome.<sup>57</sup> The US MAP to Indonesia was not the cornerstone of American influence, however; what made the greatest impact on the Indonesian Army, besides the training in the United States, was the US Civic Action Program (CAP).<sup>58</sup> Civic Action was the Kennedy Administration's new approach to the Third World; it was quick to receive support from both within and outside the government. To many minds, Indonesia was the perfect place for a Civic Action Program.

In April 1961, just prior to Sukarno's Washington visit,<sup>59</sup> a memo was written

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<sup>57</sup>DDRS(RC) 558D; Cable from George Ball to US Representatives in Europe(28JAN62); he stated that the US would continue to supply arms to Indonesia in spite of the Western New Guinea question, in order to maintain influence with the Indonesian Government. DDRS(82) 001786; "Memorandum from Dean Rusk to President Johnson, re: Meeting with Tunku Rahman"; Rusk told Johnson that when meeting with Tunku Rahman he should stress that the military aid then going to Indonesia was for those elements that were interested and capable of resisting a PKI takeover. Emphasis is mine.

<sup>58</sup>For purposes of this paper I treated the CAP as separate from the MAP; this is not the case. Funding for a CAP is contained within MAP funds. However, since the vast majority of military assistance to Indonesia was slated for Civic Action, it is simpler to use the term CAP instead of intermingling the two terms.

<sup>59</sup>This was Sukarno's first official visit to Washington under the auspices of the Kennedy Administration.

by BG Edward Lansdale to the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. In this memo Lansdale stated his desire to put together a Civic Action Program(CAP) for Indonesia,to be presented to Sukarno during his US visit. He noted the benefits that this type of program could achieve,i.e.,building up the Indonesian Army and bringing both it and the US Army closer to the Indonesian people.<sup>60</sup> While this is the first mention of a CAP for Indonesia,and a briefing for Sukarno did not occur,the new administration was receptive to the idea.<sup>61</sup>

One of the first steps in bringing a CAP to Indonesia was taken in August 1961,when the Humphrey Mission travelled to Jakarta for an assessment of the possibilities for such a program in Indonesia.<sup>62</sup> After a thorough briefing by Nasution,on the Indonesian Army's role in nation-building and economic growth,the Mission returned to issue a very positive report on conditions for a

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<sup>60</sup>DDRS(75) 154B; Memo dated 12APR61.

<sup>61</sup>Bunnell Notes;pp.1-4b and pp.8-15; Bunnell writes that the probable reason that a proposal was not forwarded was Lansdale's lack of comprehension of the Indonesian political scene,as well as,a similar lack concerning internal US government debate over Indonesian policy and the West Irian issue. These "notes" are a rough draft of a paper(dated Jan/Feb 1974) which was lent to me by Dr. Ben Anderson from the files of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. These pages provide an overview of the administration's developing enthusiasm for civic action.

<sup>62</sup>This mission was an economic survey team sent to Indonesia to assess what future aid might be provided for stabilization and development. It was headed by Professor Donald Humphrey of the Fletcher School and Dr. Walter Salant of the Brookings Institution. Bunnell Notes(JAN74),p.12.

civic action program.<sup>63</sup>

By July 1962, the Administration was already in the midst of launching its CAP for Indonesia and by early 1963 it was in full swing. The CAP for Indonesia would weather all the crises that were to arise between then and 1 October 1965. The importance of this program in the development of the TNI cannot be underestimated. The assistance provided by the US permitted the TNI to foster a new mission for themselves in the villages, both securing its presence in the community and confronting the PKI. Therefore, it is of key importance to understand the origins of the CAP and who was responsible for overseeing it.

### The Civic Action Program

The United States Civic Action Program (CAP) in Indonesia never assumed the proportions of its counterparts in The Philippines or Vietnam. On the contrary, the TNI limited the US effort in Indonesia, which was very modest, to a supporting role.<sup>64</sup> However, as limited as the US CAP was in terms of

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<sup>63</sup>Bunnell Notes, pp. 16-19.

money, material and manpower, its influence on the TNI's development would overshadow the massive Soviet and Communist Chinese aid programs to the other services.

From the outset it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the Indonesian Army had already formulated its own concept of a CAP, termed Civic Mission, which was first formulated by LTC Suwanto when he was in the Siliwangi Division, fighting the Darul Islam.<sup>65</sup> This is a key point in understanding the US part in the program, for from the outset the TNI did not want US advisors or counterparts, only the necessary equipment and the training to operate and maintain that equipment.<sup>66</sup> However much the approach to the program may have differed between the two capitals, it must be made very clear that the goal of the program was the same, i.e.; to prevent the further spread of the PKI and to maintain the pro-Western and specifically pro-American orientation of the Indonesian Army.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Conversation with Col. Benson dated 4-5 February 1988. For a confirmation of the US role see Fredrick P. Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiative in US Army-TNI Relations".

<sup>65</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., p. 138. See also Bunnell, p. 16.

<sup>66</sup>Benson conversation 4-5 Feb 88.

<sup>67</sup>DDRS (Retrospective Collection) 562F, "Memorandum of Conversation (President Kennedy, Ambassador Jones and Michael Forrestal)", dated 11 OCT 62. Essentially, Jones points out

With the return of the Humphrey Mission from Indonesia, September 1961, and the presentation of its findings, the push to place a CAP in Indonesia began to take shape.<sup>68</sup> Within the administration itself, efforts were already underway to put a program into Indonesia,<sup>69</sup> while from the embassy, Ambassador Jones was protesting the slow-down of MAP deliveries, and requesting that high-priority, non-combat projects continue, especially training and technical assistance.<sup>70</sup> The program however, did not get off the ground until July 1962, when the Department of State

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in paragraph 8, that the CAP is of vital importance as the US is pinning its hopes on the Indonesian Army to curb the PKI. He supports this by stating that since most Army officers are US-trained, and therefore anti-communist, the US government must maintain the program to maintain the relationship.

<sup>68</sup>In all fairness, that statement needs to be qualified. Perhaps none has unraveled the intricacies of US governmental bureaucratic infighting over this issue as well as Bunnell. His notes, which are available from the CMIP, are the best source for displaying what actually was taking place when I make the statement, "...taking shape", my intent is not to be cavalier, but rather the bureaucratic complexities are not within the scope of this thesis.

<sup>69</sup>DDRS(RC) 301A; Memorandum "CAP for Indonesia(17MAY62)". Harry Saunders, a member of the NSC staff, writes that Indonesia is the perfect place for a big CAP, and that this is the best way to help the Indonesian Army. Ambassador Jones had already spoken with Gen. Nasution and this could serve as the initial document to get a survey team into Indonesia.

<sup>70</sup>DDRS(RC) 559G; Cable from Jones to Secretary of State, 23MAY62. The reason for the slow-down of deliveries was the fact that the Indonesian government had commenced military operations in West Irian, against the Dutch, and the United States was trying very hard at the time to bring both sides to the negotiating table. (Jones, op. cit., pp. 188-215.)

notified the embassy that an interagency survey team was due to arrive in Indonesia in September.<sup>71</sup>

One of the most interesting aspects of the CAP in Indonesia was how it was operated. Perhaps the most overlooked factor in the success of the program was that the running of the CAP was not a joint US-Indonesia operation as in other countries, but rather a direct US Army-Indonesian Army effort.<sup>72</sup> This relationship would help to achieve one of Nasution's goals, which was that the CAP be kept solely a US Army-TNI operation.<sup>73</sup> This relationship was formalized with the selection of Col. Benson as the Special Assistant to the *Ambassador for Civic Action*. The Office of Special Assistant was very high-level and had a broad range of powers, in effect assuring that the working relationship between the US Army

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<sup>71</sup>DDRS(RC) 560F, Cable dated 8JUL62.

<sup>72</sup>Bunnell Notes, pp. 33-37. This was enhanced by the personal relationship between Generals Taylor and Nasution; *ibid.*, p. 29 and DDRS(RC) 561C, Cable from the DOS to Embassy (31AUG62).

<sup>73</sup>Benson Conversation, 4-5FEB88. There are several reasons for Nasution's position on this issue. He had an obvious distrust of the civilian side of the US government after his experience during the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion. He was probably aware of the opposition within the Kennedy Administration to the TNI's role in the civilian sector (see Bunnell Notes, pp. 33-37) which were most strongly voiced by the Agency for International Development. He could not afford to widen the channel too much, as this could increase any interference from either Sukarno or the PKI; and (this is probably one of the more important points), he felt most comfortable being able to deal with Benson.

and the TNI-AD would be sustained.<sup>74</sup> This appointment ensured that the relationship would endure despite the political upheavals that effected the public conduct of US foreign relations with Indonesia.

Bunnell writes that the CAP was discontinued in June 1963, but in conversations with Benson and from reading the cable traffic from that period, it is quite obvious that this was not the case.<sup>75</sup> The Indonesian military also did not want to see the CAP decreased, for it gave them one key tool for confronting the PKI in the rural areas; furthermore, the issue of the orientation of the officer corps was tied to the continuation of US training.<sup>76</sup> Ambassador Jones was very

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<sup>74</sup>Benson Correspondence and Conversation; Bunnell Notes, pp.2-3(Part II); Civic Action Briefing, given by Col. Benson, provided by the CMIP.

<sup>75</sup>Bunnell Notes; p.4(Part II); Benson *ibid.*; see also DDRS(RC) 908C; Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy(31AUG64), re: cut-off US military aid to Indonesia; Bundy recommended that the President only cut-off the training of Indonesian officers if it no longer desired from the Indonesian side, and that all non-military training be continued. DDRS(RC) 590B; Cable from the DOS, re: cuts in aid program; this cable informed Jones of the decision of the President to support Bundy's recommendations, i.e., cuts in military training unless otherwise requested by the Indonesians and the continuation of civic action and non-military training for police and internal security forces.

<sup>76</sup>Bunnell Notes, pp.16-19(Part I). This is a summary of Nasution's briefing to the Humphrey Mission. DDRS(75) 118B/C(19/26MAR64); these are two different cables from the embassy(Jones) to the DOS, expressing how adamant Nasution was about the continuation of the US training of Indonesian officers and the CAP. The latter cable was of a personal letter from Nasution, to be sent to Robert Kennedy, Averell Harriman and Maxwell Taylor, expressing his strong urging that these efforts be continued.



sympathetic to the TNI's predicament. He fully supported the CAP and the training of officers in the US. But the TNI was in a difficult political situation. If it was to compete effectively with the PKI for Sukarno's favor, it had to ride the "Crush Malaysia" bandwagon.<sup>77</sup> Fortunately, the Pentagon had a good understanding of the Indonesian military's feelings and points-of-view; many US officers had gone to school with the senior Indonesian commanders, almost all of whom were American trained, most of the top Indonesian Army generals being graduates of CGSC.<sup>78</sup> Hence, even though the Congress passed the Broomfield Amendment which put a halt to a great deal of aid, selected military aid and technical training still continued throughout 1964, though at reduced levels.<sup>79</sup> Even after

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<sup>77</sup>Benson conversation(4-5FEB88); Jones, *op. cit.*, p.271.

<sup>78</sup>Jones, *op. cit.*, p.203.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.279,299 and 324-5. The Broomfield Amendment, to the Foreign Aid bill passed on July 25, 1963, stipulated that all military and economic assistance to Indonesia was to be halted unless the President determined such assistance to be in the national interest. As a side note to this, the General Accounting Office conducted an inquiry into the MAP for Indonesia, publishing its findings 6MAY64[DDRS(79) 41A]. It found a number of technical deficiencies with the embassy's control procedures, but essentially agreed that it appeared to meet its objectives. The DOD included a dissenting opinion which is of some interest; it said that the report needed to emphasize the political nature of this MAP, to show the role the TNI-AD was assuming in government affairs and its emerging as a major force to combat Communism. Therefore, Indonesia's MAP was not based on external defense, but on a policy of assisting and influencing the Armed Forces to retain a non-Communist posture.

Sukarno's famous 17 August 1964, Independence Day speech, the TNI was still receiving aid and equipment.

The introduction and growth of the Civic Action program in Indonesia has been traced above, but what was the content of the program and where was it conducted?

As mentioned previously, the Indonesians first developed the concept and implemented it in the West Java region in order to combat the influence of Darul Islam. Under General Ibrahim Adjie<sup>80</sup>, the Siliwangi Division launched "*Operasi Bhakti*", after the final military defeat of Darul Islam, to reconstruct and assist in the development of the region. This program eventually became the model for the Indonesian Army.<sup>81</sup>

The Indonesian Civic Action Program (*Operasi Karya or Pembinaan Wilayah*) centered around the development of farming techniques and some special projects, such as transmigration and cooperative farming (in many cases

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<sup>80</sup>Ibrahim Adjie was trained in the United States and from 1960-1966 served as the Commander of the Siliwangi Division and West Java. Regarded as very capable and honest, he was also considered by Colonel Benson as a counterinsurgency/civil affairs expert. See also, Michael Max Ehrmann, "The Indonesian Military in the Politics of Guided Democracy, 1957-1965", (MA Thesis: Cornell University, 1967). pp. 263-264.

<sup>81</sup>Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 264n and 270-271.

these special projects were related to the major source of income for a particular region, i.e., logging or fisheries). In addition, the Army made major efforts to improve communications and roadways through all the regions under the purview of this program.<sup>82</sup> It was also, most importantly, a national effort. Prior to 1963, some regions had been conducting these efforts in an autonomous fashion, so that in a way the launching of *Operasi Karya* was an effort by the GHQ to regain some measure of control.<sup>83</sup> The success of the program depended to a great extent on two factors, the assistance of the US in terms of money and equipment and the training of Indonesian officers.

The US Army's assistance to the Indonesian Army centered around the supplying of heavy engineering equipment, farm tools and training to support the operation and maintenance of the heavy equipment.<sup>84</sup> The training of the Indonesians by the US took place in Medan, Malang, Bogor and Jakarta.<sup>85</sup> The construction equipment saw its heaviest use on Sumatra; under the auspices of

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid., pp270-288. Ehrmann gives an overview of all the regional commands, but concentrates chiefly on Java.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p.290.

<sup>84</sup>Civic Action Briefing, by Colonel Benson. From CMIP.

<sup>85</sup>This training was conducted by a Mobile Training Team (MTT) of US Army engineers. They were responsible for training the operators and mechanics of the construction equipment.

the regional commander, Brigadier General R.A. Kosasih, construction was begun on the huge Trans-Sumatran Highway. In addition to this obvious effort, the US also financed the training of selected Indonesian officers at civilian institutions in the United States, in programs that related to the management of civilian enterprises.<sup>86</sup> It is estimated that overall anywhere between 17%-25% of the Indonesian Army's general officers received training in US Army service schools. Hence, it is imperative to assess how this training has impacted on the development of the Indonesian Army.<sup>87</sup>

### Educational Development and Training

The impact of US Army influence on the educational system in the Indonesian Army is rather difficult to assess unless one has the opportunity to

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<sup>86</sup>For example, officers were either sent to academic institutions, e.g., Harvard for an advanced degree or were in a group program that centered around a short course at either Syracuse or Pittsburg. (Civic Action Briefing/Benson) For example, according to Colonel Benson, Sudarto and Hartawan who were the Chief and Deputy of the Engineer Corps were trained in the US at the Engineer School (Fort Belvoir, VA), as was his contact on the Operations staff, Josef Muskita, who had been trained at CGSC. Benson correspondence (11 JAN 88).

<sup>87</sup>The calculations are my own, drawn from the CMIP's "Current Military Data" files and *The Indonesian Military Leaders: Biographical and Other Background Data* (1979).

attend some of the courses that were taught at the two armies' various training centers. However, some conclusions can be drawn from the various participants in that period.

Gen. Yani's efforts at modernization provide a good insight into the effect of US training on the development of the TNI's educational system. One of his goals was to revamp the educational system of the TNI, and the keys to this reorganization were to be the returnees from the US Army's branch schools. Generally speaking, an officer returning from a tour in a US Service School would be assigned as an instructor in the corresponding TNI Training Center for at least one year.<sup>88</sup>

But, Yani was no less deeply concerned with the longterm professional development of the senior officers. He established what was known as the "C" Course at SSKAD (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat*: Staff and Command School). This was a special one-time course, a short-course for the most senior officers in the TNI who because of their Revolutionary experience were out of the normal pattern of development for Army officers. It taught them the

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<sup>88</sup>Correspondence with Col. Benson (11 JAN 88).

new staff techniques as well as the new operational developments that had been learned in the United States.<sup>89</sup>

Perhaps Yani's most notable impact on the educational system, was in the creation of the Military Academy at Magelang. The Academy was modeled on the US Military Academy at West Point, New York. Colonel Benson, relates that he passed to the Indonesian Army all the available information on courses, structure, curriculum and organization of West Point. As a consequence, the Magelang Academy is, on a smaller scale, almost a duplicate for West Point.<sup>90</sup>

There were many courses that contributed to the development of the Indonesian Army, but it is very difficult to pin-point precisely how some of these courses effected the TNI. There was a special course run in Hawaii (1959) on counter-insurgency/intelligence operations, where a great deal of political information was taught that apparently was very influential on the Army's

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<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid. Peter Britton, "The Indonesian Army: Stabiliser and Dynamiser", in Rex Mortimer, ed., *Showcase State*. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973). pp.97-98; Britton points out that the cadets received intense indoctrination in the concept of *Dwi-Fungsi*, something obviously absent from West Point's curriculum.

development. Additionally, there were courses going on that were quite influential, but again there is no way to judge their impact, as the course content is not available.<sup>91</sup>

The courses cited above, while certainly having an influence on the Indonesian Army, were apparently not conducted on a continuing basis.<sup>92</sup> What can be evaluated are the effect of regular courses conducted at US Army training centers, the most potent and influential being the year long Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

CGSC is a one year long course of study to prepare the US Army's middle-ranking officers for command and staff level positions in divisional units or higher. The content of the course is varied, but generally speaking for the years 1954-1964, the majority of the course load is on operations (see Tables 1 and 2).<sup>93</sup> Yani's efforts at modernizing the fighting units of the Indonesian Army would have

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., DDRS(75) 173B; Memo for McGeorge Bundy from M.V. Forrestal (6FEB64). re: Aid to Indonesia. Forrestal states that DOD has all its training programs for Indonesian officers under review, had cancelled Ft. Bragg/Counter-Insurgency courses, but that there were some courses that were going or starting soon that, "would make British hair stand on end."

<sup>92</sup> Benson, 11 JAN 88; he mentioned that the Hawaii course was set-up on the request of the Embassy and was for Indonesians only.

<sup>93</sup> R.A. Doughty and K.V. Smith, *The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976*. Staff Study for the Command and General Staff College.

Table 1. Content of Curriculum at the US Command and General Staff

College According to Staff Areas<sup>94</sup>

(Figures are Percentages)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Ops</u>	<u>Intell</u>	<u>Log</u>	<u>Pers</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
1954	53.8	?	?	?	?	100
1956	54.3	12.6	24.5	6.8	1.8	100
1958	48.6	15.8	22.2	10.7	2.7	100
1959	41.7	17.0	25.6	10.8	4.9	100
1960	40.0	18.0	26.0	11.0	5.0	100
1961	40.0	18.0	26.0	11.0	5.0	100
1963	44.1	13.1	20.4	8.8	13.6	100
1966	42.0	11.0	16.0	6.0	25.0	100

<sup>94</sup>R.A. Doughty and K.V. Smith, *The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976*. Staff Study for the CGSC: 1976. The terminology is as follows: Ops/Operations, Intell/Intelligence, Log/Logistics, Pers/Personnel. These are the four major positions on any staff and instruction in their respective functions is concerned with managing the information flow to each for each staff officer and the unit's resources that are dedicated to that office, in a war-time environment, so that the commander has timely and accurate information on which to base his decisions.



Table 2. Hours of Instruction in Tactical Operations at the US Command and General Staff College<sup>95</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Total</u> <sup>96</sup>
1953-1954	364	119	119	602
1954-1955	378	153	86	617
1955-1956	349	183	88	620
1956-1957	309	210	66	585
1957-1958	403	75	45	523
1958-1959	398	63	48	509
1959-1960	351	78	42	471
1960-1961	372	75	42	489
1961-1962	366	69	30	465
1962-1963	312	54	30	396
1963-1964	303	66	33	402
1964-1965	288	66	39	393

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<sup>95</sup>This data has been extracted from Doughty and Smith, *ibid.*

<sup>96</sup>Divisional operations concerns the deployment of battalions/brigades, Corps operations is concerned with the deployment of divisions and Army operations is concerned with the deployment of corps/divisions.

benefited greatly from this emphasis in the curriculum. He reportedly told all the officers preparing to attend CGSC to pay attention to the sections on Operations and Intelligence, but that they need not overly concern themselves with Logistics and Administration.<sup>97</sup>

The US training received at CGSC also served another important function from the point-of-view of the Indonesian Army leadership, that of securing the loyalty of the officer corps.<sup>98</sup> Here, attendance would not be sufficient to secure the loyalty of an individual officer; he would have to feel that on his return he received the type of assignment commensurate with the high prestige school. As can be seen from the Appendix, the initial group of officers trained at the CGSC were mainly infantry officers, and their follow-on assignments were, to a great extent, made with an eye towards securing the loyalty of the Army's most important commanders and upper level policy-makers in the Army and the government.

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<sup>97</sup>Benson, 11 JAN 88.

<sup>98</sup>McVey, Part 2, pp. 162-171. While the United States was not the only country to provide military training, it was, and still is, considered the most prestigious of the foreign training assignments.

Relevant to all this was a CIA report of October 1966. The Agency stated, that approximately 2800 Indonesian officers had been trained in US Service Schools, and that the impact of US/Western training was extensive. US military manuals and texts were being widely used, and POIs (Programs of Instruction), in Indonesian Army branch schools were nearly identical with their US counterparts. In spite of the Indonesian governments's anti-American posture, US training and equipment was still highly valued by Indonesian military officers.<sup>99</sup>

### The Special Forces

(Komando Pasukan Khusus: KOPASSUS)

The effort to upgrade the professional education of the Indonesian officer corps would all have been for naught had not some major institutional reorganization taken place within the TNI. To use the new skills of the returning officers, and to prevent a recurrence of regional unrest, a new powerful long-range strike capability was needed in the Army's inventory. The initial step was taken with the formation of the 11PKAD (*Resimen Parakomando Angkatan Darat*, Army

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<sup>99</sup>DDRS(79) 343B; CIA Report "Communist Military Assistance to Indonesia", Oct 66.

Parachute Regiment) on 16 April 1953.<sup>100</sup>

Our coverage here will be brief, for the techniques and doctrine employed by almost all airborne forces are roughly identical. The RPKAD was in existence before Gen. Yani became influential in the development of the Indonesian Army. However, it was Yani who turned the RPKAD into the mobile force the government, especially the Army, needed to impose its will throughout the archipelago.<sup>101</sup> The origins of the RPKAD, do not seem to stem from any secret source; it appears that the unit was the result of its time, when elite units, usually airborne, were one of the symbols of a nation's status.<sup>102</sup>

The RPKAD is a descendent of the Third Territorial Commando Force, formed by Alex Kawilarang in West Java in 1952. The first commander of this unit was Major Idjon Djambi, a former KNIL officer, a mark of the initial Dutch

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<sup>100</sup>Current Data on the Indonesia Military, supplied by Dr. Ben Anderson.

<sup>101</sup>Benson, correspondence with the author, 11 JAN 88.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., and conversation with Col. Benson, 4-5 FEB 88. This is probably at least a partially correct assessment; according to LTC Jusuf Domi (Army Attaché, Indonesian Embassy), however, the need for a force of this nature was recognized during the insurrection in East Indonesia (1952, the Republic of South Moluccas). He said that General Poniman, who was present during the Republican forces attack, related to him that the staff realized then that their losses would have been much lighter had a more highly mobile force been available.

influence in its organization.<sup>103</sup> But, the RPKAD only became nationally prominent as a result of its operations during the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion, which led to its, and the other elite units' deployment in the operations against the Dutch on West Irian in 1961-1962.<sup>104</sup> The Army's units were grouped under one command, TJADUAD (Army General Reserve) which was designed to provide Army GHQ with the forces it needed to respond to any challenge throughout the archipelago. It was however, the operations in West Irian which were to prove to be the unifying factor for these units.<sup>105</sup> The operations in West Irian were conducted under the control of the Mandala Command (January 1962), led by

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<sup>103</sup>McVey, Part 2, p. 174 gives the date for the formation of the Third Territorial Komando Force; Dr. Ben Anderson supplied me with the information about Djambi and the initial Dutch influence which was the result of the Netherlands Military Mission. If anyone could be said to have molded the RPKAD, it was perhaps its most influential commander, Sarwo Edhie, who was a graduate of the US Army's Infantry School at Ft. Benning, Georgia, where the US Army's Ranger course and Airborne course are located. This is not to say that what he learned there influenced the tactical deployment of the RPKAD above company-level, but it would have given him a very sound basis for developing training programs for his officers and NCOs. (Current Military Data)

<sup>104</sup>McVey, *ibid.*; the other units were the Raider Battalions from the Java divisions (Green Berets) and an Airborne unit, Brigade III, that was part of this system; apparently it was trained in airborne operations only, which distinguished it from the RPKAD. Additionally, the Navy had the KKO (Commando Corps) and the Air Force had its PGT (Pasukan Gerak Tjepat). Of all these units the Army's held the most influence, closely followed by the KKO.

<sup>105</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 175-176. It must be pointed out that the command system was not a perfect one. The RPKAD was more directly linked to the center than the other elite Army units, which kept some ties with their regional divisions. These ties were even stronger in the case of the Navy's and the Air Force's units, which only responded to their respective services.

Major General Suharto and comprised mostly of TJADUAD units. This experience quickly formed the basis for a shared sense of camaraderie amongst the Army's elite units. This spirit when combined with the political fervor surrounding the campaign and the prestige accumulated by Suharto as its commander, firmly established the TJADUAD as a force for the center--and for Suharto.<sup>106</sup>

Following the conclusion of the West Irian operations, the TJADUAD was reorganized as the KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Command) in May 1963.<sup>107</sup> This unit was part of the efforts of the "para-minded" army leaders to create an Airborne division for Indonesia.<sup>108</sup> This increase in the Indonesian Army's interest in airborne and special operations coincided, in 1958, with a major increase in the US Army's CGSC hours of instruction given over to the same topic. This is not to say that the US Army was singlehandedly responsible for this development in the Indonesian Army, but if one compares the number of Indonesian officers who attended school during the period 1958-1965, the

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<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 176 and footnote.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., McVey also points out that this was finally achieved in June 1966 with the formation of the LINUD (Airborne division).

majority of the total number of Indonesian officers trained during the entire period covered received instruction in this 8 year span(see the Appendix and Table 3).

The main mission of the RPKAD has been to function as a Quick Reaction Force to any threats throughout the Indonesian archipelago. In order to be able to react as swiftly as possible,the command structure of the RPKAD must have as few levels as possible; it does. Both before 1 October 1965,and after,the RPKAD chain-of-command has gone directly to the KSAD.<sup>109</sup> It is also not unreasonable to speculate that the RPKAD has acquired an additional mission in the field of intelligence. Based on its deployment during the post-1 October 1965 Affair alone,this would seem to be a reasonable assumption; most likely it is associated with the Intelligence Task Force of the *Badan Intelijen Strategis*(BAIS or Strategic Intelligence Unit).<sup>110</sup>

### Territorial Warfare Doctrine

Even though the Indonesian Army's Territorial Warfare Doctrine pre-dated

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<sup>109</sup>Conversation with Colonel Benson,4-5FEB88; and with Colonel Maynard 17MAR88.

<sup>110</sup>BAIS is equivalent to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Table 3. The number of hours of instruction in airborne operations given at the Command and General Staff College(1953-1965)<sup>111</sup>

<u>Class</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Hours of Instruction</u>
1953-1954	Airborne Operations	61
1954-1955	Airborne Operations	60
1955-1956	Airborne Operations	29
1956-1957	Airborne Division Operations	
	Special Operations	65
1957-1958	Airborne Operations,Army	
	Aviation and Unconventional Warfare	148 <sup>112</sup>
1958-1959	Airborne Operations,Army	
	Aviation and Unconventional Warfare Course of Study <sup>113</sup>	159

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<sup>111</sup>This material has been compiled by the author from the Programs of Instruction issued by the Command and General Staff College for each academic year.

<sup>112</sup>Probably,the increase in the hours of instruction was due to the growing interest within the US Army about airmobility,i.e.,the use of helicopters. This came about in large measure due to the French success with them in Indochina.

<sup>113</sup>"This course of study includes operations in the areas of airborne division,airborne corps,Army aviation,air-landed operations of the infantry division,aerial resupply and unconventional warfare....These subject areas are grouped into one course of study presented by one department to insure the coordinated,energetic pursuit of concepts of airmobility under all conditions of warfare....Instruction in unconventional warfare encompasses guerrilla and antiguerrilla operations and the politico-psychological aspects of modern war within the scope of the College mission,and emphasizes the vital importance of this dimension of war,present and future." Catalog of



<u>Class</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Hours of Instruction</u>
1959-1960	Airborne Operations, Army Aviation and Unconventional Warfare Course of Study	165
1960-1961	Airborne Operations, Army Aviation and Unconventional Warfare Course of Study	164
1961-1962	Department of Airborne Operations	136
1962-1963	Department of Joint, Combined and Special Operations	171
1963-1964	Department of Joint, Combined and Special Operations	166
1964-1965	Department of Joint, Combined and Special Operations	169

US influence, the doctrine was significantly reinforced in its development by the US MAP. The US military assistance made it possible for the TNI to return to the villages, a function that had been denied them since the lifting of martial law by Sukarno, in May 1963. In order to confront the spread of the PKI in the villages, the Army needed to implement the strategy that had worked so well for it in West Java, but it lacked the funds and equipment to conduct this operation. To this end the US was able to assist the Indonesian Army, and in the process the Indonesian Army was able to translate its doctrine for territorial war, into a governing ideology. This ideology soon came to be known as *Dwi-Fungsi*, or dual function.<sup>114</sup>

This concept of the dual function of the Army had first been proposed by Nasution as the "Middle Way", according to which the Army would neither seek to overthrow the government nor remain politically inactive. This was formalized at the Army seminar held in April 1965 which stated that the armed forces had a dual role as both a "military force" and a "social-political force". As a "social-political force" the Army's activities included participation in "the

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<sup>114</sup>Crouch, op. cit., p. 345. The doctrine was called *Dwi-Fungsi* after the all-Army seminar in August 1966 which endorsed the all-pervasive expansion of the armed forces into Indonesian life.

ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields."<sup>115</sup>

The institutionalization of the doctrine was accomplished through the establishment of the SUAD VI (*Seksi Khusus Urusan Karya Angkatan Darat*/Special Section for Business Affairs) which managed all the Army's extra-military affairs and officers. In addition, as already mentioned, the Civic Action Program (*Operasi Bhakti*) developed by the Siliwangi Division was formalized for all the Army, and was disseminated through a centralized Territorial Training School.<sup>116</sup> The importance of the doctrine is further reflected in the curriculum of SESKOAD, where it has received over 32% of the time devoted to instruction, and purely military subjects are taught less than 50% of the time.<sup>117</sup> If one accepts the proposition that SESKOAD is the single most important source of leaders in Indonesia, then the final step in the institutionalization of the Dual Function of the Army can be completed.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup>Crouch, op. cit., pp. 24-25. See also, Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

<sup>116</sup>Sundhaussen, op. cit., pp. 175-176. This was also confirmed by Colonel Benson who visited the training center during his second tour.

<sup>117</sup>Charles Donald McFetridge, "SESKOAD--Training the Elite", *Indonesia*, no. 36, October 1983, p. 94. McFetridge attended SESKOAD 1982-1983.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 87-88. McFetridge also argues that Magelang may soon overshadow SESKOAD (which it apparently has) in importance, but that still does not dispute the fact that graduates of SESKOAD occupy major positions in the government.

McFetridge's article points out that the curriculum of SESKOAD has not been influenced by the exposure of some of its graduates to foreign military schooling, including the CGSC. Thus its emphasis on the Dual Function is obviously intentional; if the US did not influence the doctrine through its educational training the only alternative source has been the experience provided by the Civic Action Program.

The opportunity for the TNI to renew its efforts in the villages would not have been possible without US assistance, and the opportunity was used to its greatest potential.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

The object of this study has been to determine the effect of the United States Army on the development of the Indonesian Army. To do so, a picture of the Indonesian Army was created that when analysed in terms of the US military assistance effort, shows a clear impact of the US Army on the TNI's development. In the previous chapter, the effects of this influence were seen on parts of the Indonesian Army, or more accurately, the officer corps as a whole. The question then becomes, was the US Army able to establish an all-encompassing influence, and if so, then what was it?

The seeds for the Indonesian Army's contention that they have a right to be involved in civilian political affairs were sown in the Revolution. The highly nationalistic spirit of the ex-PETA, *Giyugun* and *lasykar* officers, quickly overcame the apolitical training of the Breda-trained ex-KNIL officers, and met no resistance from the more politicized "Bandung cadets".

This politicization of the officer corps, which during the revolution was created largely from the bottom up, was further enhanced by the war-time strategy pursued by the Army, which was elevated to become the national defense doctrine after the war, namely locally based guerrilla warfare. This strategy called for the assumption of power by the Army in times of war (or crisis) through the creation of an administrative system parallel to the civil bureaucracy. After years of operations under martial law (1950-1963), this strategy was formally adopted as the Army's fighting doctrine, i.e., Territorial Warfare.

The Indonesian Army was still severely undertrained; it was in need of modernization. The inability of the Army to project its forces outside of Java underlined this weakness. Two things were required to fulfill this goal, professional education and modern military equipment. While the equipment demands were filled by the Soviet Union for the most part, the Indonesian Army turned towards the United States to enhance its professional education. There were several reasons for this: the US Army also comprised a non-aligned, secular officer corps; meaning that the Indonesians need not fear any unwelcome ideologies being pressed on their officers. In conjunction with the reluctance of

the Soviet bloc to provide training for the main political force opposing the PKI, left the Indonesians but little choice. There was one special factor that has often been overlooked; the extent to which Indonesian military officers perceived international relations in terms of their private relations with foreign officers. Especially was this so, in the case of Colonel Benson with whom the Indonesian General Staff had a close and lasting relationship. As a consequence the conduct of the Civic Action Program in Indonesia was carried out strictly through an army-to-army channel.

This channel would not have been able to be sustained however, without a common bond to link the two officer corps, and that bond was graduation from the US Army's Command and General Staff College. There were 53 Indonesian officers who attended CGSC between 1953-1965, with the vast majority in the period 1959-1965. This was not all however, for almost 2800 officers were trained throughout the US over the entire time period (see Table 4: Number of Indonesian Officers Trained in the United States). That figure almost doubled between 1965 to 1976, with 5,003 students receiving training. It has continued on the average of 180 students a year, for a total of 6,754 students trained by 1986.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military*

Table 4. Number of Indonesian Officers Trained in the United States<sup>2</sup>

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Students Trained</u>
1950	0
1951	0
1952	8
1953	16
1954	15
1955	0
1956	0
1957	0
1958	0
1959	41
1960	201
1961	498
1962	1017
1963	568
1964	313
1965	3

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*Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, September 30, 1986.

<sup>2</sup>Data courtesy of the Defense Security Assistance Agency



As can be seen from Table 1 (Content of Curriculum According to Staff Areas), the doctrine of the TNI would have been effected only tactically. Hence, the influence of the US Army has had to lie somewhere else. In addition to enhancing technical skills, US assistance has influenced the political orientation of the Indonesian officer corps. On the basis of its historical experiences, there is no clear evidence that suggests why the orientation of the Indonesian officer corps should have developed in a pro-American/Western direction. On the contrary, given its revolutionary origins one would have expected the officer corps to have developed a neutralist or centrist orientation. Although we have explained why it did not develop a leftist or fundamentalist religious viewpoint, there is no obvious reason for its Western orientation except one, i.e., the influence of the US Army's training. It is also important to note, that the greatest numbers of Indonesian officers trained occurred at the height of the TNI's own efforts at Civic Action, which were supported both materially and educationally by the US. The success of the program, in effect, hinged on the US-trained officers.

The current pro-American stance of the Indonesian government can be attributed in great measure to the pre-Gestapu efforts of the United States to assist the Indonesian Army in its confrontation with the PKI. Recent history suggests that through the still continuing education of Indonesian officers in US Army schools, it is likely this stance will be maintained for some time to come.

APPENDIX  
INDONESIAN GRADUATES OF THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF  
COLLEGE  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS  
AND  
FOLLOW-ON ASSIGNMENTS<sup>1</sup>

Rachmat Kartakusumah(1953); Chief of Staff(KAS) to the Director General of the Ministry of Defense; Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Sumatran Command.

Achmad Y. Mokoginta(1954); Assistant Commander Siliwangi Division;  
Commandant SESKOAD.

Candra Hasan(1955); served as SUAD I(Intelligence) until 1956,when he was fired. Did not surface again until the 1980's.

Achmad Yani(1956); Commander "Operation 17 August"(against the PRRI);  
SUAD II(Operations) and Commander of the Army.

Wiloyo Puspayudo(1957); Deputy Commandant SESKOAD,member DPRGR for  
ABRI.

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<sup>1</sup>The list of graduates was made available to me through the office of the Deputy Commandant. The follow on assignments were obtained through the Current Military Data files and *The Indonesian Military Leaders*. The year an Officer graduated from CGSC will follow his name in brackets, followed by his known assignment at the time.

Winfried Nainggolan(1957); joined the PRRI committed suicide.

Achmad Tirtosudiro(1957); Commander Bandung Garrison(Siliwangi),Army  
Quartermaster(Director Intendans AD).

Soerono Reksodimedjo(1958); Vice Governor Military  
Academy(AMN),KasKodam VII/Diponegoro.

Harsono Kasmowidjojo(1959); unknown.

Josef Muskita(1959); Deputy SUAD II,KAS KOANDA/Sumatra.

Sunggoro Notohamidjojo(1959); Kas Operasi Tumpas(against Andi Selle),Kas  
Indonesia Timor.

Suwarto(1959); Assistant Commandant SESKOAD.

Darjatmo(1959); Director Signal Corps,Kas Telekomunikasi KOTI,Panglima Bukit  
Barisan.

Sentot Iskandardinata(1959); Governor AMN,military attaché to Australia,Director  
Directorate of Transportation(AD).

Brotosewojo(1960); First Assistant Minister for Veteran's Affairs,Director Directorate of Distribution.

Abdul Rasjid(1960); also attended Engineer Course(1953),Ambassador to Cambodia/Laos and to the Philippines,Chief of the private staff(SPRI) to the Army Commander(PANGAD).

Achmad Wiranatakusumah(1960); Kas Mandala Command,Chief Group I(Intel) KOTI.

Rukmito Hendraningrat(1960); Chairman Retooling Committee,Chief Advance Party for Indonesian Congo Force,Ambassador to Pakistan.

Sutopo Juwono(1960); Instructor SESKOAD; Kas South Kalimantan.

Alibasah Saleh(1961); *unknown*.

Sudradjat(1961); SESKOAD,Vice Chairman Supreme Audit Council; Secretary General Minister of Finance.

A. Muhdar Amin(1961); Assistant Operations to the SUAD; Lecturer SESKOAD; Director Doctrine Development(HANKAM).

R. Hartojo Martodihardjo(1961); unknown.

Jonosewojo Handajaningrat(1961); Chairman Pelti(Indonesian Lawn Tennis Association).

R. Sucipto Danusukumo(1962); Commander MOBRIK,Panglima Police.

Teuku Hamzah Bendahara(1962); military attaché to Washington.

Iskandar Ranuwihardjo(1962); Kas Kodam III/Central Sumatra,military attaché to Cairo.

R. Hadi Purnomo(1962); Assistant I to the Director Military Police(CPM),Lecturer LEMHANNAS,KAS KOSTRAD.

Alamsjah(1962); KAS regional Command South Sumatra; SUAD VII(Finance); Coordinator SPRI.

Suwito Harjoko(1962); Panglima Kodam III/Central Sumatra.

Mohamad Charis Suhud(1962); SUAD I(Intelligence); Assistant Intelligence HANKAM.

R.W. Widakdo(1962); Assistant Director Directorate of Transportation(AD).

Daniel Anwar(1963); MOBRIG.

Subroto Kusmardjo(1963); Staff Supreme Command Economic Operations(KOTOE); Special Assistant Minister of Agriculture.

Panoedjoe(1963); Panglima KODAM III,Army Quartermaster.

Raden A. Tanuamidjaja(1963); unknown.

Barkah Tirtadidjaja(1963); Siliwangi?,Commander Karya AD.

Amino Gondohutomo(1963); GOLKAR.

Achmad Sajid Soebagio(1963); Assistant Commander SATGAS GAB "Sumpit".

Utomo Utojo(1963); Chief Army Transportation,Assistant Minister for National Business Affairs.

Widodo(1963); Assistant 4 Kas Kodam VII/Diponegoro,Assistant Kas Kodam VII/Diponegoro,Kas Kodam VII/Diponegoro.

Kartidjo(1963); Pangdam XVII Irbar/Cendramasih; VIII(Brawijaya); Commander Army Training Center(KOPLAT-AD).

Johannus Sugito(1963); probably commander CPM in Jakarta.

Abdoellah(1964); unknown.

Augustinus Soetardhio(1964); Assistant Director CPM,Attorney General.

Sumantri Sumantoro(1964); Chief of Information SESKOAD.

Haeruddin Tasning(1964); KAS KODAM XIV(South/Southeast Sulawesi).

Donald I. Pandjaitan(1964); SUAD IV(Logistics),killed in Gestapu.

Junus Samosir(1964); Assistant SUAD I(Intel)/Pangad.

Soedirgo(1964); Director CPM,SUAD I/Pangad.

Taswin Natadiningrat(1964); with Yani to Pakistan,Personal Staff President Suharto(SPRI); Ambassador to the Netherlands.



Mohammad Ishak Djuarsa(1964); Commander KODAM I(Aceh),Pangdam IV/Sriwijaya.

Widjojo Soejono(1964); Commander Bde III RPKAD(Airborne),PangKOPUR IV/KOSTRAD,Commander RPKAD.

Raksoseivito Sahirman(1965); involved in Gestapu.

Iman Zakaria(1965); unknown.

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